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1Introduction
The number of activities one can undertake is almost inﬁnite. The amount of time
an individual has at his disposal is not, however. Therefore, individuals have to
choose how much time to spend on each of these activities. For a labor economist the
model is simpler: individuals either enjoy leisure time or they spend time working for
an income. The income earned is used to buy consumption goods. That is, people
essentially face a trade-oﬀ between enjoying leisure time and buying consumption
goods. For a given wage rate, some prefer to have a lot of leisure time, work short
hours and buy few consumption goods. Others prefer to work long hours, have few
holidays a year and buy a lot of consumption goods.
In neoclassical theory these diﬀerences in labor supply are explained by diﬀerences
in earning capacity, other income, and preferences for leisure and commodity goods.
That is, the optimal combination of buying consumption goods and having leisure
time in the labor-consumption schedule is aﬀected by (i) a rotation of the budget
constraint following a change in the wage rate, (ii) a shift of the budget constraint
following a change in other income, and (iii) preferences. That is, agents facing a
similar wage rate and enjoying the same level of other income may still end up at
diﬀerent optima when they value consumption goods and leisure time diﬀerently
(Killingsworth, 1983, p.10).
Within the framework of neoclassical theory, empirical research has shown that
factors other than those captured by this simple model aﬀect labor supply
decisions. Examples are diﬀerences in family size (Angrist and Evans, 1998) and the
availability and costs of child care (Attanasio et al., 2008; Del Boca and Vuri, 2007).
Yet, the analysis of labor supply – estimating the eﬀect of changes in explanatory
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variables on labor supply – is subject to more challenges, two of which are the
subject of this thesis.
First, there are discrepancies between actual and preferred working hours, which
may complicate the eﬀects of a change in the wage rate on working hours (see Kahn
and Lang, 1991). Several studies document these discrepancies.1 Moreover, there is
suggestive empirical evidence that there exists heterogeneity in these discrepancies
among working women in the Netherlands (Booth and Van Ours, 2013; Keuzenkamp
et al., 2009; Portegijs et al., 2008). However, there is no study that systematically
investigates these discrepancies. As such, little is known about the relation between
the desire to change working hours and individual background characteristics of
working Dutch women. This is the ﬁrst main issue we tackle in this thesis.
Second, preferences for work and leisure may change over time. Individual
preferences might, for example, be subject to habit formation, such that preferences
change according to one’s behavior (e.g. Bover, 1991; Vendrik, 1993). Preferences
may also evolve over time for other reasons, such as changing social norms (e.g.
Ferna´ndez, 2013; Fogli and Veldkamp, 2011), or because individuals’ preferences are
aﬀected by the behavior of others (Blomquist, 1993; Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1998).
Researchers who want to identify these reference eﬀects face certain problems.
In the case of interdependent preferences for work and leisure, i.e. the eﬀect of
someone’s labor supply behavior on someone else’s preferences, it is common to
relate individual working hours to the average hours worked in a certain reference
group. However, there is no guarantee that the variation in the average working
hours of the reference group is a legitimate source of variation for identifying
preference interdependence. Variation in this average only identiﬁes preference
interdependence if it is not driven by factors that also directly aﬀect the individual’s
preferred hours. For example, a sudden increase in the workload that causes an
increase in hours worked across the board might aﬀect everybody’s preferred hours
(e.g. through habit formation), and would hence introduce a spurious correlation
between average hours and individual preferred hours.
The analysis of habit formation – the eﬀect of past behavior on current preferences
– faces a similar problem.2 Explaining current behavior by lagged behavior in
an individual-ﬁxed-eﬀects model introduces a correlation between the independent
variable of interest and the residual. In order to properly investigate the existence
of reference eﬀects like the ones mentioned here, we ideally need some source of
exogenous variation. This is the second main issue addressed in this thesis.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we investigate the heterogeneity in the desire to change the
weekly working hours among working women in the Netherlands. In Chapters 4
and 5, we analyze to what extent labor supply preferences are subject to reference
1Examples are Euwals (2001) and Euwals and Van Soest (1999) for the Netherlands, Kahn
and Lang (1995) and Barrett and Doiron (2001) for Canada, Stewart and Swaﬃeld (1997) and
Bo¨heim and Taylor (2004) for Britain, and Holst (2009) for Germany.
2See for example Bover (1991) and Hotz et al. (1988).
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eﬀects, making use of a policy change that aﬀected the standard workweek for a
particular group of employees.
Several studies have uncovered discrepancies between actual and preferred working
hours among working women in the Netherlands. In Chapter 2 we add to the
previous literature by presenting an integrated analysis of the determinants of
these discrepancies. Speciﬁcally, we carry out a regression analysis with the desired
change in weekly working hours as the dependent variable and several individual
background, demographic and ﬁnancial characteristics, and satisfaction measures
as independent variables.
The results from the heterogeneity analysis indicate that there is a sizable group of
part-time-working women who would like to increase their weekly working hours,
mainly women who perform semi- or unskilled manual labor and women with lower
educational attainment. At the same time, a substantial number of working women
would prefer to reduce the number of weekly working hours. Relatively many highly
educated women are in the latter group. On the basis of these results we hint at
policy implications and suggest it might be possible to increase working hours when
policy is aimed towards those already willing to increase their weekly hours.
In Chapter 3 we examine how women’s desire to work fewer or more hours varies
between and within segments of the labor market. We calculate the number of hours
beyond which there is, on average, a tendency to prefer a decrease in hours worked.
This point is allowed to vary with background characteristics. We then investigate
which proportion of each group that works more than this particular number of
hours. This proportion is an indication of how many women with a particular set
of characteristics are expected to prefer to work less.
The results indicate that this ‘equilibrium’ point where average actual and preferred
working hours are equal depends on individual characteristics. Given that this point
diﬀers between groups of individuals, we show that the relative sizes of the groups
working longer and shorter hours diﬀer between groups.
In Chapter 4 we analyze whether reference points aﬀect labor supply decisions.
Several theories build on the idea that reference points aﬀect preferences for work
and leisure. Examples of such reference eﬀects are preference interdependence (e.g.,
Blomquist, 1993), habit formation (e.g., Vendrik, 1993), internalization of a social
norm (e.g., Grodner and Kniesner, 2006) and anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study we analyze
whether preferences for work and leisure are aﬀected by such reference eﬀects.
We exploit arguably exogenous changes in the length of the standard workweek
of (former) West German civil servants (Beamte) and public sector employees
(Angestellte im o¨ﬀentlichen Dienst) and investigate whether the preferred number
of hours worked changes in response to reductions and extensions in the length of
the standard workweek. In particular, we estimate a standard labor supply model
in which we model an individual’s preferred working hours as a function of the
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standard working time and conventional determinants of labor supply.
We ﬁnd that the variations in the standard workweek signiﬁcantly and strongly
aﬀect the preferences for weekly working hours. A reduction in the standard
workweek was followed by a strong contemporaneous decrease in preferred hours.
However, in subsequent years preferences partly reverted back to the old level,
such that the long-run eﬀect was smaller than the short-run eﬀect. A workweek
extension led to a gradual increase in preferred weekly working hours over time.
That is, we ﬁnd an asymmetry in the adjustment process of preferred labor supply
for extensions and reductions of standard working hours.
The analysis in Chapter 4 leaves unanswered how preferences are shaped. One of
the potential channels is preference interdependence with respect to hours worked.
That is, individuals may prefer to work longer hours following an increase in the
standard working time because they observe their co-workers working longer hours.
In Chapter 5 we attempt to isolate the eﬀect of the labor supply decisions by
colleagues on someone’s individual labor supply preferences. We assess empirically
whether an increase in the average hours worked by colleagues, induced by an
extension of the standard workweek, leads to an increase in the preferred working
hours of people unaﬀected by this policy.
The results suggest that the changes in standard and average hours worked of civil
servants signiﬁcantly impacted the preferred hours of public sector employees. A
one-hour increase in the average hours worked by civil servants increases desired
hours of public sector employees by about two-thirds of an hour. We also estimate
a reduced-form model. Results from this model indicate that a one-hour increase
in the standard workweek of civil servants leads to a ﬁfteen-minute increase in the
preferred working hours of (former) West German public sector employees.
4
2Working longer or shorter hours:
Heterogeneity among working women1
2.1 Introduction
Compared to other countries in the European Union, there are many women in paid
employment in the Netherlands. Yet, the vast majority of Dutch women works
in part-time jobs (Statistics Netherlands, 2009). The part-time nature of female
employment in the Netherlands has long been an issue debated by policy makers as
well as academics.2 In an attempt to (1) address the eﬀects of the aging population
– the rising cost of the welfare state and the decreasing potential labor force –
and to (2) reduce the ﬁnancial dependency of wives on their husbands, the Dutch
government founded the Task Force Part-time Plus in 2008. The Task Force’s goal
was to increase female employment in the Netherlands in terms of working hours
(Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, 2008).
Given the part-time nature of female employment and the changing demographic
composition of the potential work force it is not surprising that many recent studies
investigate the labor supply preferences of Dutch women. In this chapter we provide
more insight into the size of discrepancies between the preferred and actual working
hours and investigate whether individual characteristics are related to the preferred
change in weekly working hours. In light of the attempts to raise participation
of working women, we investigate whether it is possible to increase working hours
1This chapter is based on joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Maarten Vendrik. It concerns
a revised and translated version of a paper that is published in TPEdigitaal (Loog et al., 2011).
2See for example Bosch et al. (2010), Booth and Van Ours (2013) and TPEdigitaal 3(2).
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among working women, taking as a starting point the preferences for hours worked
under current conditions. The results highlight the importance of heterogeneity,
which has implications for policy aimed at increasing working hours.
Several studies examine the labor supply preferences of working women in the
Netherlands. Keuzenkamp et al. (2009) analyze preferences of women working in
jobs of a maximum of 24 hours a week. The authors show that these women would,
on average, prefer a two-hour increase in their weekly working time. Portegijs
et al. (2008) show that most women who work long hours actually prefer working
fewer hours. The authors also show that a fraction of the female work force would
like to increase hours under improved working conditions (e.g. being able to work
from home more often) and discuss the characteristics of only this group.3 Clo¨ın
(2010) focuses on labor supply decisions of mothers and shows that highly educated
mothers make similar trade-oﬀs with respect to the length of their workweek as
mothers with lower educational attainment. Yet, a higher fraction of the highly
educated mothers would prefer to work less, while a higher fraction of less educated
mothers would prefer to work more. These studies uncover discrepancies between
actual and preferred working hours.4 We augment this literature by presenting an
integrated analysis of the determinants of these discrepancies for all working Dutch
women.
In the next section we present data that show considerable heterogeneity among
working women with respect to the desired change in working hours. In Section
2.3 we investigate how background characteristics correlate with the discrepancy
between actual and preferred hours. In Section 2.4 we discuss policy implications,
and propose a policy measure that could partly resolve this discrepancy. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
The data used in this chapter come from the Longitudinal Internet Studies
for the Social sciences (LISS), a representative, probability-based internet panel
(Scherpenzeel, 2011). The data we use contain information on 4,568 observations of
2,285 women aged between 16 and 59 (inclusive) who were in gainful employment
for at least one year in the 2008-2010 period. The main variables of interest in
3In Portegijs et al. (2008) respondents are ﬁrst asked to state their preferred hours: “If you
yourself would be able to decide, how many hours per week would you like to work? Please,
take into account the ﬁnancial consequences of your decision.” Afterwards individuals are asked
what conditions must be fulﬁlled such that the respondent will start working these stated-
preferred hours, implying that the ﬁrst question does not ask for preferred hours under the current
circumstances, but under ideal conditions (e.g. being able to arrange child care).
4Diﬀerences between actual and preferred working hours can be explained theoretically. Becker
(1971) and Hashimoto (1981) provide an explanation based on ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Lazear
(1979, 1981) explains the discrepancy using principal-agent theory. Kahn and Lang (1992) test
both theories and do not ﬁnd empirical support for either of these theoretical arguments.
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the current study are the actual and preferred weekly working hours (h and hp
respectively).5 Besides information on (preferred) labor supply we have data on
demographic and socio-economic background characteristics. We restrict the sample
to women who work as employees and who are not in full-time education.6
We combine information from separate questions related to working hours, one for
average weekly working hours in the main job and one for hours in any potential
second job. The wording of the question concerning working hours in the main
job is as follows: “How many hours per week do you actually work in your job, on
average? If you have multiple jobs, please report the number of hours worked in
your main job. Whether overtime is paid or not is irrelevant.” The wording of the
question concerning working hours in a potential second job: “How many hours per
week do you usually work in your additional job?”. The wording of the question
concerning the preferred working hours per week is as follows: “How many hours
per week would you like to work? Please consider the hours worked in all of your
jobs combined”.7 We assume that the question concerning preferred hours hp is
answered for the current job(s).8
2.2.1 Actual and preferred hours
Of the 1,443 employed female respondents in the 2010 wave of the LISS, most work
24 hours per week (10.4 percent), followed by the groups working 40, 32 and 20
hours per week (9.8, 8.7 and 6.9 percent respectively).9 As shown in Figure 2.1,
jobs with a 32-hour workweek are most popular (17 percent). Jobs of 24 and 20
hours rank second and third (15.5 and 11.7 percent respectively). Only 8 percent
of the working women prefer to work 40 hours per week. Roughly 44 percent of the
5The predictive power of preferred weekly working hours has been evaluated by Euwals et al.
(1998). The authors show that – in addition to qualitative information – including preferred hours
information in their model helps predicting future actual hours.
6We also exclude women who receive disability beneﬁts, women with a net hourly wage of over
100 euros, women with a net monthly labor income of over 12,000 euros and women whose other
household income exceeds 12,000 euros.
7The original wording of the Dutch questions is: “Hoeveel uur per week werkt u gemiddeld
in werkelijkheid in uw baan? Hebt u meerdere banen neem dan de voor u belangrijkste baan.
Of overuren al dan niet betaald worden doet niet terzake” and “Hoeveel uur per week werkt u
gewoonlijk in deze bijbaan of tweede werkkring?” and “Hoeveel uren per week zou u in totaal
willen werken? Het gaat om het aantal uren in alle banen die u hebt, bij elkaar genomen”.
8This assumption seems to be justiﬁed by the setup of the questionnaire. Before respondents
are asked for their preferred weekly working hours, they are asked whether they want to have
“other or more work”. Because of the wording of the question we are unable to tell whether an
individual who answers with “yes” wants another job, more work, or both. In any case, only about
5 percent of the sample answered “yes” to this question, and excluding them from the analysis
neither alters the main results nor the conclusions.
9The high degree of heterogeneity in the length of the workweek is typical for the Dutch labor
market and the ﬂexibility that is implied may be the reason why so many women are working,
as suggested by the work of Van Lomwel and Van Ours (2005) and Gregory and Connolly (2008,
p.F52).
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Figure 2.1: Preferred working hours per week.
Note: Presented numbers are based on survey responses in the 2010-wave of the LISS panel.
women in the sample want to work less than they currently do. Only 18 percent
would like to increase their weekly working hours. The remaining 38 percent do
not desire a change in weekly hours. On average, the diﬀerence between preferred
and actual hours amounts to negative 2.1. That is, women would like to work
signiﬁcantly less: 26.6 hours instead of their current 28.7 hours.
2.2.2 Background characteristics
In Table 2.1 we split the sample into three groups, depending on whether and how
individual women would like to change their weekly working hours. Background
characteristics of women who want to work shorter (hp < h) and longer (hp > h)
hours can be found in columns (1) and (3) respectively. Background characteristics
of women who do not want to change weekly hours (hp = h) are presented in column
(2). In column (4) we indicate whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
averages (or percentages) in columns (1) and (3). That is, we investigate whether
those who want to work shorter and longer hours diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect
to background characteristics.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Condition on preferred hours hp < h hp = h hp > h (1) - (3)
Hours
Actual hours (h) 34.2 26.1 20.7 ***
(9.8) (8.5) (8.7)
Preferred hours (hp) 26.7 26.1 27.3
(9.2) (8.5) (8.5)
Preferred change in actual hours (hm) -7.5 - 6.6 ***
(6.3) - (5.2)
Educational attainment
Primary or no education 1% 3% 3%
Preparatory secondary vocational education 11% 22% 30% ***
Senior general secondary- or pre-university education 9% 7% 11%
Basic vocational training 25% 39% 31% *
Higher professional education 38% 21% 18% ***
Academic higher education 13% 5% 5% ***
Demographics
Age 41.1 43.0 41.6
(10.4) (10.3) (10.1)
Number of children living in the household 1.0 1.2 1.3 ***
(1.1) (1.1) (1.2)
Married 52% 66% 58%
Divorced 10% 10% 12%
Cohabiting, no children in household 31% 28% 24% **
Cohabiting with children in household 43% 54% 52% **
Single, no children in household 19% 11% 13% *
Single with children in household 7% 7% 11% *
Type of job and sector
Semi- or unskilled manual work 6% 15% 21% ***
Health and welfare 30% 35% 35%
Government services and public administration 8% 9% 6%
Business services 8% 5% 4% ***
Financial services 5% 5% 2% **
Utilities production, distribution and/or trade 0% 1% 0%
Education 20% 7% 8% ***
Retail trade 5% 10% 10% ***
Industrial production 4% 3% 3%
Construction 1% 2% 1%
Catering 2% 2% 5% **
Transport, storage and communication 2% 3% 2%
Environmental services, culture recreation 2% 2% 3%
Other sectors 11% 15% 18% **
Has multiple jobs 7% 3% 10% *
Financial information (Net, in euros)
Wage rate 11.29 11.24 11.88
(4.71) (3.56) (8.90)
Wage (without 10% extremes) 10.96 10.97 10.64
(2.33) (2.16) (2.92)
Personal income of non-cohabiting respondents 1,879 1,608 1,261 ***
(665) (559) (417)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 2010-wave (continued from previous page)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Condition on preferred hours hp < h hp = h hp > h (1) - (3)
Personal income of cohabiting respondent 1,537 1,184 877 ***
(606) (475) (450)
Other income of cohabiting respondents 2,165 2,170 2,120
(1,033) (988) (978)
Satisfaction with job aspects
Wage 6.8 6.9 6.2 ***
(1.7) (1.7) (2.1)
Working hours 7.2 7.9 7.5 ***
(1.7) (1.4) (1.6)
Type of job 7.5 7.8 7.0 ***
(1.5) (1.4) (2.0)
Atmosphere 7.5 7.8 7.5
(1.5) (1.3) (1.6)
Career 7.2 7.5 6.6 ***
(1.4) (1.3) (2.0)
Current job 7.3 7.7 6.9 ***
(1.4) (1.3) (1.9)
Amount of leisure 6.3 7.1 6.9 ***
(1.9) (1.6) (2.0)
Number of observations 631 552 260
Note: Descriptive statistics of working women for diﬀerent conditions on preferred and actual working hours. In
column (1) we present the characteristics of women who would like to work shorter hours, column (2) for those
who do not want to change working hours and column (3) for those who want to work longer hours. Presented
numbers are based on survey responses in the 2010-wave of the LISS panel. Standard deviations are presented in
parentheses.
Table 2.1 reveals diﬀerences between women who want to work longer and those
who want to work shorter hours. In the ﬁrst panel, we show information on the
actual and preferred weekly working hours. Those willing to decrease working
hours are concentrated in jobs with relatively long hours, whereas those who want
to work more are predominantly in part-time jobs and currently work relatively
few hours a week.10 Even though the groups diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to
many characteristics, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the preferred weekly
working hours of the two groups. This suggests a strong tendency, on average, for
Dutch women to prefer a part-time job (see also Booth and Van Ours, 2013).
The majority of women who prefer to reduce working hours graduated from
university (academic higher education) or graduated from hbo (higher professional
education). These education categories seem to be relatively over-represented in
this group, compared to women who would like to work longer hours. Indeed,
relatively many women who prefer to work more have below-average educational
attainment. We ﬁnd a similar pattern for the percentage of women performing
semi- or low-skilled manual labor. The desire to increase or reduce the number of
10Smulders and de Feyter (2001) also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of actual hours on preferred
hours.
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working hours also diﬀers per sector. Women working in retail predominantly want
to work more, while women in education and business services most often want to
work less. We also ﬁnd diﬀerences with respect to several measures related to life
and job satisfaction.11 In general, women who prefer to reduce working hours are
more satisﬁed with the diﬀerent aspects of their job. However, they are signiﬁcantly
less happy with the amount of leisure they have at their disposal. The women who
reported that they worked their preferred number of hours are the happiest with
the diﬀerent attributes of their job.
2.3 Regression analysis
We next investigate the correlations between the preferred change in working hours
and the background characteristics presented in Table 2.1, holding other factors
constant.12 We denote the diﬀerence between the hours a woman prefers to work
(hp) and the hours she actually works (h) by hm, i.e. hm = hp − h. We
perform a regression analysis which isolates the eﬀects of the diﬀerent background
characteristics on the preferred change in working hours:
hmit = α0 +α
′xit + it. (2.1)
The column vector xit contains individual characteristics and a constant term,
whereas the coeﬃcients in the row vector α′ measure the eﬀects of these
characteristics on hm, keeping everything else constant.13 For age, the number of
children and income- and satisfaction variables, we subtract the average in the base
category from the individual value, which allows us to interpret the constant term
as an estimate of the average value of hm in the base category. The base category
consists of women who have completed mbo (basic vocational training), who are
working in health care or the welfare sector, who do not provide semi-skilled or
unskilled manual labor, are cohabiting (married and unmarried), and whose family
owns the house they live in. Results are reported in Table 2.2.
In column 1 of Table 2.2 we present the relationship between the background
variables and the desired change in working hours, excluding income and satisfaction
11All satisfaction measures are reported on a zero-to-ten scale, where a zero corresponds to “not
at all satisﬁed” and a ten to “fully satisﬁed”.
12Several studies performed analyses that are related to the one presented here. Fouarge and
Baaijens (2003) and Keuzenkamp et al. (2009) analyzed the determinants of preferred changes in
labor supply. However, in the latter study the authors exclude women working in jobs consisting
of more than 24 hours per week. Both Keuzenkamp et al. (2009) and Fouarge and Baaijens (2003)
control for the actual working hours in their model, which makes comparison with our approach
diﬃcult. As we are interested in the background characteristics of women who prefer to work
longer or shorter hours, we do not include actual working hours as an explanatory variable.
13In the model presented here we follow Booth and Van Ours (2013) and allow for an individual
eﬀect that is not correlated with the explanatory variables by estimating a random-eﬀects model.
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variables to highlight the correlations between socio-demographic characteristics
and the desire to change working hours. Income and satisfaction variables are
potential channels through which the background characteristics could inﬂuence
hm and we therefore exclude them for now.
Table 2.2: Regression results
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: hm hm hm
Educational attainment
Academic higher education -2.06*** -3.59*** -3.30***
(0.56) (0.56) (0.54)
Higher professional education -1.23*** -2.07*** -1.92***
(0.31) (0.33) (0.34)
Senior general secondary- or pre-university education -0.11 -0.47 -0.10
(0.43) (0.45) (0.43)
Preparatory secondary vocational education 0.48 0.46 0.72**
(0.35) (0.37) (0.36)
Primary or no education -0.95 -1.18 -0.08
(0.86) (0.92) (0.95)
Demographics
Age -0.01 -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of children in the household 0.59*** 0.67*** 0.63***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Single -0.57 -1.36 -0.72
(0.39) (0.84) (0.86)
Type of job and sector
Semi- or unskilled manual labor 2.53*** 3.46*** 2.59***
(0.44) (0.48) (0.45)
Government services and public administration -0.57 -0.64 -0.43
(0.48) (0.49) (0.46)
Business services -2.14*** -2.31*** -1.80***
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Financial services -0.86** -1.15** -0.67
(0.43) (0.48) (0.50)
Utilities production, distribution and/or trade -2.70* -3.20* -3.24*
(1.56) (1.77) (1.96)
Education -2.75*** -2.02*** -1.62***
(0.45) (0.45) (0.43)
Retail trade -0.41 0.61 0.67
(0.42) (0.47) (0.47)
Industrial production -1.77*** -1.40** -1.29**
(0.56) (0.58) (0.61)
Construction -2.02* -2.50** -2.18***
(1.17) (1.12) (0.81)
Catering 0.69 1.50* 1.45*
(0.93) (0.88) (0.81)
Transport, storage and communication -2.05** -1.68* -1.16
(0.96) (0.97) (0.98)
Environmental services, culture recreation -1.00 -0.38 -0.96
(0.97) (0.95) (0.88)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2: Regression results (continued from previous page)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: hm hm hm
Other sectors -0.49 -0.07 -0.00
(0.34) (0.37) (0.35)
Financial information
Not a homeowner 0.60* 1.29*** 1.47***
(0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
ln(Hourly wage) 5.94*** 6.51***
(0.62) (0.66)
ln(Other income) -0.02 0.06
(0.11) (0.11)
Satisfaction with aspects of job
Wage -0.24***
(0.07)
Working hours 0.46***
(0.08)
Type of job -0.12
(0.12)
Career -0.39***
(0.10)
Current job 0.15
(0.12)
Atmosphere 0.02
(0.08)
Amount of leisure 0.55***
(0.06)
Constant -0.80*** -0.84*** -1.15***
(0.28) (0.30) (0.30)
Number of observations 4,468 4,249 3,806
Number of individuals 2,226 2,122 1,976
Note: Results of a random-eﬀects least squares estimation on the 2008-, 2009- and 2010-wave of the LISS
data. Following Booth and Van Ours (2013) we report standard errors clustered at the individual level between
parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level respectively. The base
category consists of women who ﬁnished intermediate vocational education, are working in the sector health care
and welfare, do not provide semi-skilled or unskilled manual labor, are cohabiting (married and unmarried) and
their family is owner of the house they live in. In each year, interviews have been conducted in diﬀerent months.
To correct for potential eﬀects the month of the interview might have on the preferred change in working hours,
add include dummies as explanatory variables to control for this. The base category has been interviewed in April
2010.
The signiﬁcant negative estimate of the constant term (-0.8; p-value < 0.01) in
column 1 indicates that women in the reference category on average want to work
shorter hours than they currently do. Keeping everything else constant, we ﬁnd
that those who completed higher vocational (-2.0; p-value < 0.01) and university
education (-2.9; p-value < 0.01) would like to reduce their working hours even
more.14 In general, highly educated women would like to work shorter hours. The
diﬀerences between the reference category (intermediate vocational education) and
the below average educated women is insigniﬁcant.
14Analogously one can calculate the average hm of women with other characteristics, by adding
the relevant coeﬃcients.
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Women who have children living in the household would like to work signiﬁcantly
more.15 We also ﬁnd that women who perform low- or unskilled labor, but whose
other characteristics are similar to those of the base category, would like to increase
working hours signiﬁcantly by 1.7 hours per week on average (p-value < 0.01).
Women working in education and business services – two of the largest sectors –
would prefer to reduce working hours signiﬁcantly by 3.6 and 2.9 on average (both
p-values < 0.01). That is, they would like to reduce working hours more than
women employed in health care and the welfare sector, who already would like to
work shorter hours than they currently do.
In column 2 we include ﬁnancial characteristics, the hourly wage and other
household income, in the model. We ﬁnd a positive correlation between the desired
change in working hours and the log of the hourly wage. The coeﬃcient implies that
an individual with a wage that is 10 percent higher than the average wage in the
base category (approximately 9.30 euros) reports a preferred increase in hours that
is 5.94 ×ln(1.1) = 0.57 hours higher than preferred hours in the base category. The
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the wage rate suggests that it could be an important instrument
for bringing preferred hours in line with actual hours, but the eﬀect size implies
that a large wage increase would be required to establish this.16
Most of the coeﬃcients on educational and sectoral controls become stronger
when including ﬁnancial incentives. The larger coeﬃcients suggest that the eﬀects
reported in column 1 are attenuated by an opposing force that is working through
the wage rate. For example, highly educated women earn a higher wage, which is
positively correlated with the desire to increase working hours. It seems that the
higher hourly wage partly corrects for the discrepancy between actual and preferred
hours.
When adding satisfaction variables in column 3, we ﬁnd a pattern that resembles
the pattern previously uncovered in Table 2.1. Greater satisfaction with one’s
career and wage rate is associated with a stronger desire to decrease working hours,
whereas a high score on satisfaction with working hours and the amount of leisure
are positively associated with hm. The coeﬃcient on the satisfaction with the
amount of leisure time (0.6; p-value < 0.01) indicates that a one-point increase in
15In a slightly reﬁned regression setup (Loog et al., 2011), we ﬁnd that mainly single and
cohabiting women without children or with one child would like to work signiﬁcantly less than
cohabiting women with two children (the base category).
16The average preferred change for women working 23 hours or more per week is about -3.8
hours. According to the parameter estimates in Table 2.2 it would require an increase in the wage
rate of 90 percent (exp( 3.85.94 ) = 1.90) in order to remove this discrepancy. That is, if one would
interpret the coeﬃcient on the wage rate as a causal eﬀect. Furthermore, a positive change in hm
may also be the result of less demand, as a result of higher wages. This follows from the fact that
actual hours h likely depend on demanded hours hd as well as preferred hours hp. If we simplify
this relationship as the weighted average h = αhp + (1 − α)hd with 0 < α < 1, it can be shown
that ∂hm∂w = (1 − α)(∂hp∂w − ∂hd∂w ). A positive sign of ∂hm∂w could then be the result of ∂hd∂w < 0 as
well as ∂hp∂w > 0. Moreover, Dutch women do not seem to react strongly to an increase in the wage
rate (Bosch and Van Der Klaauw, 2012; Evers et al., 2008).
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the satisfaction-scale leads to a 0.6-hour increase in hm.
The results indicate that the dissatisfaction with the amount of leisure time is
expressed in the desire to decrease weekly working hours. Leisure is what is left
after subtracting time spent working for pay and time for home production (e.g.
running errands, child rearing, etc.) from the total endowment of time (Mincer,
1963). The importance of leisure time is reﬂected in the less negative coeﬃcients
on the independent variables and holds in particular for the highly educated, for
singles (albeit insigniﬁcant) and for those working in business services, ﬁnancial
services and education. Apparently, the marginal utility of leisure is higher than
the marginal utility they would indirectly (via salary or social contacts and the
like) derive from an additional hour of work. Therefore, they would like to work
less. Indeed, Portegijs et al. (2008) show that enjoying more leisure time is a major
reason why Dutch women work in part-time jobs.
The strong negative coeﬃcients for the highly educated and the signiﬁcant positive
coeﬃcients for the below-average educated and semi- or unskilled manual workers
suggest that there is currently relatively more demand for highly educated than
for less educated workers. The fact that many women still work in ‘small part-
time jobs’, the reason for founding the Task Force Part-time Plus, is therefore not
entirely attributable to the fact that they do not want to work longer hours. It seems
that, at the current wage rate, there is not enough demand for the types of labor
supplied by particular subgroups of the female work force. This holds in particular
for the less educated and for those performing semi- or unskilled manual work.17
This conjecture is conﬁrmed by survey information presented by Keuzenkamp et al.
(2009) who show that many women working in the cleaning sector would like to
work longer hours in their current jobs, but are unable to do so.
Other characteristics also explain part of the variation in the desired change. In
some of the larger sectors like business services, ﬁnancial services and education,
women have an even stronger tendency to want to reduce their weekly working
hours than in the sector health care and welfare, where women would already prefer
a sizable hours reduction. Age also plays a signiﬁcant role. Especially older women
would like to work less. On the other hand, the wage rate positively aﬀects hm.
However, it is questionable to what extent the wage rate can make up for the
discrepancies uncovered here (see footnote 16). Therefore, it seems important to
think of other instruments that are likely to positively aﬀect preferred working
hours.
17Because we do not include a full set of interaction eﬀects between all the characteristics of
interest, it is theoretically possible that those performing semi- or unskilled manual labor are
highly educated individuals who would like to work longer hours in a job at their own education
level. However, the fraction of highly educated women in semi- or unskilled manual labor is
negligible.
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2.4 Policy
The analysis in this chapter has identiﬁed two particular groups of working women:
a group consisting of relatively high-wage workers who, on average, currently work
longer hours and who would like to reduce working hours, and a second group of
women with less than average education who work few hours and often perform
semi- or unskilled manual labor. The latter group prefers to increase their weekly
working hours.18
The heterogeneity described here indicates that a fraction of the female work force
would like to work longer hours per week than they currently do, even though
women would like to work shorter hours on average. This ﬁnding suggests that
increasing participation on the intensive margin across the board is not only a
matter of stimulating labor supply, but also one of stimulating the demand for
certain tasks. Moreover, solely stimulating the supply side would not yield higher
hours worked for all women, as several workers already prefer to work longer hours
under current conditions. This concerns mainly lower educated women, or women
who are performing semi- or low skilled manual labor.19
One example of a policy intervention that would take into account the discrepancies
shown in this study could be to stimulate the market for household services.
Such services could be provided by those who are currently supplying unskilled
labor, and are willing to work longer hours. Stimulating the purchase of home-
production services20 may increase participation along the intensive margin of those
who would like to work longer hours already (semi- and unskilled manual workers
and those with a below-average educational attainment), while it might reduce
the discrepancy between actual and preferred hours of the highly educated women
who prefer to work shorter hours. Whether buying household services can decrease
the discrepancy between actual and preferred hours should be examined in future
research. The potential success depends on a number of factors which will be brieﬂy
discussed in turn. First, we should get a clear overview of the tasks that women
who want to work shorter hours, i.e. who would like to enjoy more leisure, would
prefer not to do themselves.21 The extent to which women appreciate certain tasks
18About seven percent of the sample in the 2010-wave consists of women who are performing
semi- or unskilled manual labor and women who ﬁnished intermediate secondary (or lower)
education who would like to increase weekly working hours. The desired increase in working
hours is about seven.
19The motivation behind writing this chapter was the ongoing debate of increasing female
labor force participation along the intensive margin. We therefore do not discuss whether it
is economically desirable to artiﬁcially increase the demand for products or services. Moreover,
we are aware of the fact that we perform a partial-equilibrium analysis. That is, we do not fully
account for the demand side of the market. Assuming actual hours are generated as described in
footnote 16, we at least partially account for the demand side.
20Tijdens (2000) discusses several services to enhance employee comfort, so-called
“gemaksdiensten”.
21Portegijs et al. (2008) discuss conditions under which women who already indicate to be willing
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or activities has been the subject of international research (Kahneman et al., 2004;
Krueger et al., 2009), but such research has to the best of our knowledge not yet
been carried out among Dutch women (who want to work fewer hours).
Second, it has to be examined whether women who would like to work longer
hours, and in particular those who are currently in semi- or unskilled manual jobs,
are willing to perform the type of services referred to above. The fact that a large
proportion of women in the cleaning sector wants to work longer hours in their
current job (Keuzenkamp et al., 2009) suggests that they might also want to do so
in a comparable job.
Third, the (latent) demand for personal or household services needs to be activated,
either directly via households or indirectly via employers. Buying personal services
does not yet seem ingrained in our culture and cultural change may be a necessary
condition for the aforementioned idea to be successful. It should become socially
accepted to buy low- or unskilled services that someone prefers not to perform
themselves. The high untapped potential at the lower end of the labor market, and
the desire for more leisure time at the top of the market, suggests that this is not
yet the case. This conjecture seems to be conﬁrmed by information from the Labor
Accounts (Arbeidsrekeningen) of Statistics Netherlands. The number of working
hours by “persons employed by private households” increased by only 4.8 percent
between 1990 and 2010, from 125 to 131 million hours (CBS StatLine). In the same
period, the number of double-income families of which at least one partner works
full time increased by 58.3 percent (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).
The aforementioned questions cannot be analyzed using our data. However, given
the amount of attention paid to studies that have ‘increasing participation’ as a
starting point, it seems in general interesting to develop policies aimed at the group
of women that wants to work longer hours already, which will increase hours worked
at the lower end of the labor market. This might then reduce the discrepancy
between preferred working time at the higher end of the labor market, which is by
itself desirable (Wooden et al., 2009).
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented evidence for heterogeneity with respect to the
discrepancy between actual and preferred working hours per week. Based on the
analysis we can conclude that increasing participation in terms of working hours
across the board is not just a matter of stimulating supply. Several women would
already like to increase working hours under current circumstances.
The analysis shows that women who perform semi- or unskilled manual labor,
to work longer hours will do so. For our study especially women who want to work shorter hours
– those disregarded by the study mentioned here – are of key importance.
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mainly the lower educated, would like to work longer hours than they currently do.
On the other hand, especially highly educated women, usually working relatively
long hours on average, want to work shorter hours.
The particular nature of the heterogeneity with respect to the discrepancy between
actual and preferred hours suggests that policy could be aimed at promoting
substitution of household production for leisure time, that is, higher educated
women who want to work shorter hours should be stimulated to purchase personal
services on the market, where such services are produced by women in low-
and unskilled manual jobs who would like to work longer hours. This form of
substitution could create a more eﬃcient allocation on the labor market. We
show, using data on preferred working hours, that the promotion of outsourcing
of household production may be eﬀective in this respect. Moreover, such a policy
might increase average participation along the intensive margin.
One important caveat pertains to the implicit assumption made in this chapter,
which is that women prefer (or are indiﬀerent to) time devoted to market work over
housework. This assumption may not hold for all women. In that case, the above-
mentioned policy recommendation does not have an eﬀect on all working women.
Future research should investigate how Dutch working women value market work
compared to household production.
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3.1 Introduction
Policymakers in the Netherlands are concerned about the consequences of the aging
society as aging leads to a smaller potential workforce and tax base, threatening the
sustainability of the welfare state. To mitigate the problem of the shrinking working
population, policymakers would welcome an increase in total hours worked. Such an
increase could result from an increase in the participation rate (extensive margin) or
an increase in the number of working hours by individuals already working (intensive
margin).
At the extensive margin there seems to be little scope for increasing total hours:
Relative to the European Union as a whole, Dutch men and women more often
work in paid jobs (Statistics Netherlands, 2009) and the growth in the female
participation rate is likely to decrease in the near future (Euwals et al., 2011).
However, the intensive margin does oﬀer scope to increase total hours, particularly
among the large share of working women in the Netherlands who work part-time.2,3
1This chapter is based on joint work with Thomas Dohmen and Maarten Vendrik, and is
published in De Economist (Loog et al., 2013). We thank Didier Fouarge, participants at the
Nederlandse ArbeidsmarktDag (The Hague, 2011) as well as an anonymous referee for comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.
2This possible route of increasing the tax base has been acknowledged by policymakers and led
to the creation of the Task Force Part-time Plus in 2008 (Task Force Part-time Plus, 2008, 2010)
to address this issue (Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, 2008).
3The strong and prevalent preference among women for part-time jobs is well documented in
the literature (e.g., Booth and Van Ours, 2013; Portegijs et al., 2008).
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The analysis in the previous chapter reveals that working women diﬀer with respect
to their preferences for work and leisure. When considering policies aimed at
increasing the total number of working hours by women, it seems apparent that
policies for women who prefer to work longer hours need a diﬀerent focus than
policies for those who prefer to work less. Consider, for example, a supply-
stimulating policy. If applied, policy should primarily be focused on the latter group
for at least two reasons. First, the fact that employers like this group to work longer
hours than they prefer to work suggests excess demand for such women. This is
not the case for those who already prefer to work longer hours. Rather, in order
to increase hours worked in the latter group, one may consider policies stimulating
the demand side of the market.4 Second, aligning preferred and actual working
hours seems to be welfare-enhancing (Wooden et al., 2009) and at the same time
may also have positive long-term eﬀects on female labor supply, since women who
would like to work (substantially) shorter hours have a stronger tendency to leave
the workforce altogether (Euwals, 2001).
To examine how the desire to work shorter or longer hours varies among and within
segments of the labor market, we extend the concept of “equilibrium hours of work”
(denoted h0), as introduced in Booth and Van Ours (2013), who estimate two
linear probability models relating preferences for working longer and shorter hours
to actual working time. The authors ﬁnd that the probability of preferring to work
longer hours decreases with the number of hours worked, whereas the probability of
preferring to work shorter hours increases with the number of working hours. The
authors estimate that the two probabilities are equal at about 22 hours per week
and denote this as the equilibrium hours of work.5
Our approach consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part of the analysis we calculate
the number of hours beyond which there is a tendency to prefer a decrease in hours
on average. We allow this point to vary with group-speciﬁc characteristics such as
age and educational attainment. The second part of the analysis investigates what
proportion of each type/group works longer hours than its equilibrium value. This
fraction is an indication of how many women with a particular set of characteristics
we expect to be willing to work shorter hours. A high fraction for a certain group
would indicate, for example, that a supply-stimulating policy may be fruitful to
increase working hours within this group.
In the next section we describe the data used in the analysis. Section 3.3
elaborates on the discrepancy between actual and preferred working hours, and
the interpretation of the concept of equilibrium hours of work. Section 3.4 discusses
the estimation of this equilibrium. Section 3.5 presents the analysis. Section 3.6
discusses the study’s relevance for policy and concludes.
4See the previous chapter of this dissertation.
5In the context of Booth and Van Ours (2013) the notion of equilibrium means that, on average,
individuals do not prefer to work longer or shorter hours. It does not imply that no individual
would like to change hours.
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3.2 Data
The data used in the ﬁrst part of the analysis are drawn from the ‘Work and
Schooling’ survey of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS).
The LISS is a representative, probability-based internet panel (Scherpenzeel, 2011)
which provides us with detailed socioeconomic, demographic, and labor supply
information.6 We restrict the sample to working women aged between 16 and
59 (inclusive) who worked in 2008, 2009, and/or 2010. Students, self-employed
workers, and recipients of disability beneﬁts are excluded from the sample. We also
exclude women who work or prefer to work more than 84 hours a week.
The variables of interest are the actual and preferred number of weekly working
hours (h and hp, respectively). The wording of the question regarding the actual
hours is as follows: “How many hours per week do you actually on average work in
your job? If you have multiple jobs, please consider the job most important to you.
Whether or not extra hours are paid is irrelevant.” A similar question asks for the
number of hours worked in a second job. For women with more than one job, about
six percent of the female respondents in 2010, the answers to these two questions
are added to construct actual hours, h. The wording of the question regarding the
preferred number of hours (hp) is as follows: “How many hours per week in total
would you like to work? This concerns the amount of hours worked in all of your
jobs combined.”7 We assume that this question is answered with respect to their
current job(s) and current conditions of employment and circumstances, not under
the assumption of “ideal circumstances” (e.g. being able to arrange child care).8 In
addition, we assume that the partner’s labor supply and income are perceived as
exogenous by the subject.9 Combining information on the preferred labor supply
with the total number of hours worked in all jobs, we construct a measure for the
desired change in hours worked (hm = hp− h). This measure is positive for those
who want to work longer hours per week, negative for those who desire to work
shorter hours, and zero for those who do not want to change the number of hours
6The LISS panel is administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University).
7The wording (in Dutch) of the questions concerning average actual and preferred hours is as
follows: “Hoeveel uur per week werkt u gemiddeld in werkelijkheid in uw baan? Hebt u meerdere
banen, neem dan de voor u belangrijkste baan. Of overuren al dan niet betaald worden doet niet
terzake”; “Hoeveel uren per week zou u in totaal willen werken? Het gaat om het aantal uren in
alle banen die u hebt, bij elkaar genomen.”
8Even though the question speciﬁcally asks for “your job(s),” some may want to work longer
hours in another job. However, only six percent of the individuals in our sample stated they would
prefer “other or more work.” Unfortunately, it is impossible to distinguish between “other” and
“more.” In any case, it seems plausible that the vast majority interpreted the question according
to our assumption.
9This is one of the features of the “male chauvinist model” (Killingsworth, 1983, p. 30). The
motivation behind stimulating female labor supply is increasing tax revenues. Indeed, this would
only work if men (particularly the husbands of those women who start working longer hours)
would not decrease their hours worked in reaction to the increase in female participation. We
therefore view the partner’s labor supply (and therefore any other income in the household) as
exogenous.
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they work.
In the second part of the analysis we employ data from the 2008 Dutch Labor
Force Survey (Enqueˆte Beroepsbevolking, henceforth LFS) to investigate the share
of individuals within a certain group working longer or shorter hours than the h0
belonging to that group. The LFS is representative for the Dutch labor force.
We used data on educational attainment, the sector in which someone works, the
individual’s age, whether children are living in the household and the number of
actual weekly working hours.
3.3 Discrepancy between actual and preferred
hours
The summary statistics presented in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 reﬂect the high degree
of heterogeneity in the length of the typical workweek of Dutch women. The data
also show the part-time nature of female employment. Dutch working women prefer
a workweek of about 26 hours on average, according to our measure of preferred
hours.10
In many applications, labor economists (implicitly) assume hp = h (Kahn and
Lang, 1991), a simpliﬁcation that originates from the assumption that workers “can
freely choose employers oﬀering diﬀerent wage and hours packages” (Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999, p. 1588). Table 3.1 shows that this assumption is in stark contrast
to the situation in the Netherlands.11 On average, Dutch women would like to work
signiﬁcantly less than they currently do (p-value < 0.01). Preferred hours equal
actual hours for only 38 percent of the sample in 2010, whereas 44 percent would
like to decrease weekly hours. The remaining 18 percent would like to work longer
hours.
10Euwals et al. (1998) show that, in addition to qualitative information, using preferred hours
helps predict actual future hours.
11Diﬀerences between actual and preferred hours have been documented before (e.g.,
Keuzenkamp et al., 2009; Stewart and Swaﬃeld, 1997) and can be explained theoretically (see
footnote 4 in the previous chapter).
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variables: Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Hours
Actual hours (h) 28.7 10.5 2 70
Preferred hours (hp) 26.6 8.8 0 55
Preferred change in hours (hm) -2.1 7.1 -46 32
Demographics
Age 41.9 10.3 18 59
Number of children in household 1.1 1.1 0 6
Cohabiting, children in the household 49% 0 1
Cohabiting, no children in the household 29% 0 1
Married 58% 0 1
Education
Academic higher education (wo) 9% 0 1
Professional higher education (hbo) 28% 0 1
Basic vocational training (mbo) 31% 0 1
Income
Net hourly wage 11.4 5.4 1.7 86.6
Other income in the household 1,709 1,249 0 11,000
Note: Summary statistics based on survey responses in the 2010-wave of the LISS panel (N=1,443). Information
on actual hours (h) comes from the survey question “How many hours per week do you actually on average work
in your job? If you have multiple jobs, please consider the job most important to you. Whether or not extra
hours are paid is irrelevant.” This question is combined with information on the number of hours in a potential
additional job. Information on preferred hours (hp) comes from the survey question “How many hours per week
in total would you like to work? This concerns the amount of hours worked in all of your jobs combined.” The
desired change in hours is the diﬀerence between actual and preferred hours (hp− h). The net hourly wage
is approximated by the personal net income per month, divided by the average number of hours actually worked
per month (i.e., weekly actual hours times 4 1
3
).
Figure 3.2 illustrates the relation between actual and preferred working hours. It
plots the average value of hp conditional on h, as well as a 45-degree line on which
actual hours equal preferred. The intersection of the two lines, denoted by h0,
provides information about the tensions between the preferred hours, on the one
hand, and actual and demanded hours, on the other hand. To the left of this
point (i.e., h < h0) women on average prefer to work longer hours, whereas women
to the right of this point (i.e., h > h0) prefer to work fewer hours on average.
Consequently, the value of h0 provides us with two insights. First, the parameter
oﬀers us the ranges of hours in which policies should take a diﬀerent focus; to the left
of this point policy should be aimed at individuals who want to work longer hours.
To the right of this point policy should be tailored toward those who would like to
reduce their working hours. Second, evaluation of the relative sizes of the groups
to the left and right of this point yields insights into the scope for policy when a
particular group is targeted. Again, consider the example of a supply-stimulating
policy: The larger the fraction of a group that works hours longer than h0, the
larger the scope for policymakers to align preferred hours and actual hours worked
through a supply-stimulating policy, and the larger the scope to eventually increase
hours worked.12
12If the inequality h > h0 holds for relatively many women of a certain type, it indicates that
employers like these women to work longer hours and it may be beneﬁcial to stimulate the supply
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Figure 3.1: Actual weekly working hours
Note: The distribution of average weekly total working hours (h) by working women in the Netherlands (Source:
LISS, 2010 ).
Figure 3.3 illustrates the heterogeneity in h0 documented in the ﬁrst part of the
analysis. It shows that the point where preferred and actual hours are equal depends
on individual characteristics. The dashed line represents the preferences of non-
manual workers aged 55–59, conditional on the number of weekly working hours.
The solid line represents the same for semi- or unskilled manual workers aged 16–
35. The latter group prefers to decrease their hours worked (on average) when they
work about four days per week or more. The former group’s tendency to desire a
decrease in hours sets in earlier, at about two days per week.
3.4 Estimation
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that the relationship between actual and preferred hours
(and thus the desired change, hm) is nonlinear. The nonlinearity in hm = f(h) is
approximated by a third-order polynomial of the form
hmit = γ1(hit − h0) + γ2(hit − h0)2 + γ3(hit − h0)3 + it, (3.1)
where γ1,2,3 and h0 are parameters to be estimated by nonlinear least squares.
13
of labor within this group. This holds under the assumption that the actual number of hours
worked is a function of demanded hours as well as preferred hours: h = αhd + (1 − α)hp, where
0 < α < 1. This implies that if hp < h, hd > h.
13The Taylor approximation of f(h) at h = h0 equals f(h0)+
f ′(h0)
1! (h−h0)+ f
′′(h0)
2! (h−h0)2+
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium hours of work
Note: The average number of preferred working hours (hp) conditional on actual working hours, in three-hour
categories (Source: LISS, 2010 ).
The estimate of h0 approximates the point where actual and preferred hours are
equal.
The functional form of equation 3.1 oﬀers a neat possibility to investigate how
h0 depends on individual characteristics. As an example, consider a dichotomous
variable Uit representing whether individual i holds a university degree (Uit = 1)
or not (Uit = 0) and include it in the estimation as follows (dropping subscripts):
hm = γ1(h − h0 − βU ) + γ2(h − h0 − βU )2 + γ3(h − h0 − βU )3 + . In this case
the estimate of h0 represents the crossing point (in terms of Figure 3.2) for the base
category of no university degree (U = 0), whereas the sum of h0 and β estimates
the equilibrium hours of work for women with a university degree (U = 1). Other
characteristics of interest can be included in the analysis analogously.
Since the model has to be solved by an iterative process and since it can have
multiple solutions, the starting values for the process must be provided. We ﬁrst
estimate h0 without controls and follow Booth and Van Ours (2013) by choosing
22 as the starting value. In the next step we add one control variable and plug in
the estimate for h0 found in the previous step. The starting value for the control
variable is then set to zero, after which the model is solved for the second time
and, along with the new estimate of h0, yields an estimate of the coeﬃcient of the
control variable. This process is repeated until all controls are added.
f ′′′(h0)
3! (h−h0)3. Since the ﬁrst term equals zero, f(h0) = 0, the model has to be estimated without
a constant term. Alternatively, we could have chosen to estimate a third-order polynomial in h and
solve for h0 by equating this estimated polynomial to zero. However, our approach immediately
provides us with the estimate of h0 as well as its standard error.
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Figure 3.3: Heterogeneity in the “equilibrium hours of work”
Note: The average of preferred hours (hp) given actual hours (in three-hour categories), conditional on background
characteristics (Source: LISS, 2010 ).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Heterogeneity between segments
Table 3.2 presents the results of the estimation of model 3.1, augmented with
proxies for human capital. The reported h0 represents the hours equilibrium for
the base category. The base category consists of women who: completed their
basic vocational training (mbo); work in health care and welfare; do not provide
semi-skilled or unskilled manual labor; are aged between 35 and 44; cohabit, have
children living in the household; (co-)own their family home; earn a net hourly wage
between 14 and 25 euros; and have an additional household income between 1,000
and 2,000 euros a month. Women with these characteristics form the largest group
in the Labor Force Survey (LFS).
The hours equilibrium of the base category (h0) equals 20.7.
14 To illustrate the
impact of background characteristics on this estimate, we compare it with the hours
equilibrium of 25-34 year old university graduates working in the public sector.
Adding the relevant coeﬃcients for the latter yields an estimate of 25.9 (s.e. = 1.6),
indicating that the desire to work less sets in at about 26 hours per week. This
14The results from model 3.1 are in line with the work of Booth and Van Ours (2013). When
restricting the sample according to their study (non-single women in their prime), we ﬁnd that
hˆ0 = 21.6, which is comparable to the 21.7 hours reported by Booth and Van Ours (2013). So,
a diﬀerent method, a diﬀerent sample, and quantitative instead of qualitative data yield similar
results.
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point lies signiﬁcantly above the same estimate for the base category (p-value <
0.01). For other background characteristic types of women the coeﬃcients can be
combined in similar ways.
In general, we ﬁnd that the hours equilibrium depends on educational attainment
and that there is considerable heterogeneity between sectors. Yet, the association
between age and h0 is strongest. Women aged 55–59 have a value of h0 that is
4.5 hours less than that of the base category (women aged 35-44). In contrast, for
women in the youngest age category, the estimate of h0 is about 10 hours higher
than for the base category.
In column 2 we allow for ﬁnancial characteristics to aﬀect h0. We ﬁnd that women
in the highest wage category, constituting about 1.5 percent of the sample, have
a signiﬁcantly higher estimated value of h0. This coeﬃcient may reﬂect individual
characteristics, such as preferences for work, that are correlated with high wages.
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients for the age category remain stable, while the schooling
coeﬃcients undergo some changes. For example, the positive eﬀect of holding a
university degree on the value of h0 we found earlier is partially due to the higher
wages university graduates earned compared to women who only ﬁnished basic
vocational training.
Table 3.2: Regression results
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: hm hm
“Equilibrium hours of work”
h0 20.71*** 21.58***
(0.80) (1.10)
Education
Academic higher education 1.85* 1.12
(1.01) (1.07)
Higher professional education 0.22 -0.05
(0.67) (0.70)
Senior general secondary- or pre-university education 0.27 0.02
(1.02) (1.07)
Preparatory secondary vocational education -1.32 -1.68*
(0.81) (0.88)
Other education 0.50 0.48
(1.76) (1.87)
Primary or no education -1.70 -2.77
(1.78) (1.96)
Sector and type of work
Government services, public administration 2.21* 1.86
(1.19) (1.31)
Financial services 1.37 1.47
(1.15) (1.19)
Business services -0.95 -0.66
(0.97) (1.01)
Education -1.78** -1.80*
(0.87) (0.94)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: Regression results (continued from previous page)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: hm hm
Retail trade 2.45*** 2.65***
(0.93) (1.02)
Industrial production 1.82 1.87
(1.40) (1.51)
Construction 0.39 0.30
(2.43) (2.59)
Catering 4.44** 4.32**
(1.79) (1.80)
Transport, storage and communication 0.79 0.73
(1.56) (1.58)
Environmental services, culture, recreation -1.27 -1.74
(1.59) (1.64)
Utilities 2.04 1.09
(3.25) (3.79)
Other sectors 1.18 1.23
(0.79) (0.84)
Manual work (semi- or unskilled) 1.80* 2.10*
(1.02) (1.11)
Demographics and household composition
Age 16-24 10.23*** 9.74***
(1.62) (1.74)
Age 25-34 1.15 0.93
(0.70) (0.75)
Age 45-54 -0.20 -0.55
(0.66) (0.72)
Age 55-59 -4.47*** -4.65***
(1.00) (1.11)
No children in the household 3.00*** 2.75***
(0.58) (0.65)
Single 1.69** 0.97
(0.71) (1.36)
Financial characteristics
Not homeowner 1.84**
(0.78)
Wage rate (euros): up to 10 -0.77
(1.01)
Wage rate (euros): from 10 up to 14 -0.28
(0.81)
Wage rate (euros): 25 and above 6.79**
(2.75)
Other income (euros): up to 1,000 -0.13
(1.31)
Other income (euros): from 2,000 up to 3,000 -0.92
(0.64)
Other income (euros): 3,000 and above 0.62
(0.83)
Other (control) variables
γ1 -0.32*** -0.31***
(0.02) (0.02)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: Regression results (continued from previous page)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: hm hm
γ2 × 100 0.12 -0.04
(0.16) (0.14)
γ3 × 100 -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.44
Number of observations 4,468 4,249
Number of individuals 2,226 2,122
Note: Results of a non-linear least-squared estimation of model 3.1 on 2008–2010 LISS data. Following Booth
and Van Ours (2013), we present cluster-robust standard errors between parentheses. The superscripts ***, **,
and * indicate signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The base category is
deﬁned as follows: education, secondary vocational education; sector of employment, health and welfare; type of
job, no manual work; age, 45-54 years old; household composition, cohabiting with children living in the household;
homeownership, homeowner; wages, from 14 to 25 euros; other income, from 1,000 to 2,000 euros; month, April
2010. The month dummies are all insigniﬁcant and are not reported.
3.5.2 Heterogeneity within segments
The analysis presented above shows that the number of hours worked at which
women do not want to work longer or shorter hours (h0) varies with background
characteristics. This section investigates the fraction of women of a particular type
who work longer hours than that type/group’s value of h0. Because this section
analyzes data from subgroups, a large sample is needed. We therefore work with the
LFS in this part of the analysis.15 A drawback of the LFS is that it does not provide
income information. However, the results from the estimates presented in Table 3.2
indicate that, controlling for educational attainment and other characteristics, other
income in the household hardly aﬀects the value of h0.
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics of a selection of sizeable groups from the
LFS. Instead of providing a full-blown analysis of all possible combinations of the
coeﬃcients in column 1 of Table 3.2, we discuss a few types of workers that are
common in the LFS. We identify a separate h0 for the two largest educational
groups and sectors. In addition, we compare a relatively old to a relatively young
age category and distinguish between women with and without children. Table 3.3
presents summary statistics of only cohabiting women who do not perform semi- or
unskilled manual labor.
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 3.3 present background characteristics. As an
example, consider the second row of the table. It displays information of working
women who hold a higher vocational degree (hbo) and work in business services, are
between 25-34 years of age and live in a household without non-adult children. The
absolute number of respondents in the LFS, not calibrated to population totals,
15The available information in the LFS concerning preferred working hours is not suited for the
ﬁrst part of our analysis.
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is presented in column 5. Column 6 shows that the average woman with this
particular set of characteristics works 37.5 hours per week. Since we do not have
the appropriate information on preferred hours in the LFS (see footnote 15), column
7 presents the point estimates of the desired change in hours worked (hp−h) from a
random-eﬀects regression on LISS data (Table 3.4). From these results we calculate
the predicted value of hp−h for each of the sets of characteristics shown in Table 3.3.
Thus, when combining the relevant coeﬃcients in Table 3.4, we ﬁnd that women
with the particular bundle of characteristics presented in the second row prefer to
reduce their weekly working time by 5.1 hours (−1.24− 2.14− 0.62− 1.00− 0.13 =
−5.13). In column 8 we add up the actual hours and desired change, to ﬁnd the
preferred working time. Column 9 shows the value of h0 for each of the sets of
characteristics, according to the parameter estimates in column 1 of Table 3.2. The
ﬁnal column shows the fraction of each subgroup that works longer hours than the
h0 of that subgroup. That is, we expect that about 93 percent of the women with
a higher professional degree, who work in business services, are aged between 25-34
and live in a household without children, would like to reduce the actual weekly
working hours.
Column 10 of Table 3.3 shows considerable heterogeneity in the fraction of women
who have working hours beyond the value of h0 of their type. We uncovered
several patterns for the selected sample, which we will discuss in turn. Relative
to those with an intermediate vocational diploma (mbo), higher-educated women
work longer hours and prefer a larger reduction in weekly hours; yet, their number
of preferred hours is higher, on average. These women are also more likely to
work more than h0 hours, suggesting they are more often inclined to reduce hours.
Summary statistics from the LISS (2010 wave) conﬁrm this pattern. About 59
percent of the women with a higher vocational degree (N = 405), but only 35
percent of those with an intermediate vocational diploma (N = 454), prefer to work
fewer hours. Conditional on educational attainment, women in business services
work longer hours per week and would like to reduce their hours more than the
women working in health care and welfare. The former tend to prefer higher weekly
hours, but the diﬀerence is modest. The percentages reported in column 10 of Table
3.3 are consistently higher for women in business services. Summary statistics again
conﬁrm the pattern. About 55 percent of the women working in business services
(N = 89) would like to reduce their hours, whereas only 40 percent among those in
health care and welfare (N = 475) would.
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Table 3.4: Predicting the desired change in working hours (hm)
Dependent variable: hm
Education
Academic higher education -2.01***
(0.56)
Higher professional education -1.24***
(0.31)
Senior general secondary- or pre-university education -0.22
(0.43)
Preparatory secondary vocational education 0.40
(0.35)
Primary or no education -0.94
(1.01)
Sector and type of work
Government services and public administration -0.63
(0.41)
Financial services -0.90**
(0.45)
Business services -2.14***
(0.52)
Education -2.78***
(0.45)
Retail trade -0.43
(0.40)
Industrial production -1.84***
(0.59)
Semi- or unskilled manual work 2.58***
(0.47)
Demographics and household composition
Age 16-24 1.03
(0.71)
Age 25-34 -0.62**
(0.31)
Age 45-54 -0.18
(0.29)
Age 55-59 -0.80*
(0.42)
No child in the household -1.00***
(0.27)
Single -0.48
(0.35)
Constant -0.13
(0.33)
Number of observations 4,468
Number of individuals 2,226
Note: Results of a random eﬀects least-squares estimation with 2008-2010 LISS data. Cluster-robust standard
errors are presented between parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The following reference groups are used: education, secondary
vocational education; sector of employment, health care and welfare; type of job, no unskilled or semi-skilled
manual work; age, 35-44 years old; household composition, cohabiting, with children living in the household; and
month, April 2010.
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3 The scope for increasing total hours worked
Conditional on the sector and educational attainment, younger women work longer
hours than older women. The younger generation also prefers a higher reduction in
weekly hours, whether there are children in the household or not. The main results
in column 10 show that younger women work more than h0 hours relatively more
often. This indicates that the mismatch between actual and demanded hours, on
the one hand, and preferred working hours, on the other hand, is expected to be
more common for younger women. In the 2010 wave of the LISS, 54 percent of
those in the younger generation (N = 342) would like to work shorter hours; for the
older generation (N = 430), this percentage is 40 percent.
3.6 Concluding remarks
The current study shows that the equilibrium point where average actual working
hours meet the preferred hours depends on individual characteristics. This
heterogeneity is of interest to policymakers aiming to increase the total number
of hours worked by women. This number is informative in two ways. First, it shows
in what hour range we will ﬁnd women who want to work longer and shorter hours.
Second, we can calculate the relative sizes of these groups to examine the scope for
policy.16
As a simple illustration, we compared two groups. They both work in the health
care and welfare sector and have an intermediate vocational diploma. The ﬁrst
group is younger and does not have children, whereas the second, older group,
does. We estimate h0 to be equal to 24.9 (s.e. = 0.9) for the ﬁrst group and 20.5
(s.e. = 0.8) for the second. The diﬀerence between the two parameter estimates is
diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels of signiﬁcance (p-value < 0.01). Assume
for this example that policymakers want to consider a supply-stimulating policy.
Our estimates indicate that the labor supply of women in the former group should
be stimulated if they work about 25 hours per week or more. Below this point (h
< 25), a supply-stimulating policy seems unnecessary, because we expect that the
majority of women will be willing to work longer hours per week. The desire to
decrease working hours for the latter group comes at about 21 hours already. So,
the range of hours for which a supply-stimulating policy may be fruitful is wider
for the group of older women with children. Yet, the scope for policy interventions
(a supply-stimulating policy in this example) is much larger for the former group,
since about 80 percent of these women work longer hours than their group’s value
of h0, compared to about 45 percent in the latter group.
The instrument introduced by Booth and Van Ours (2013) and further developed
in this paper can provide useful information to policymakers, since it presents an
16While the average eﬀects of background characteristics on the desired change in hours
(previous chapter of this dissertation) are informative, they do not disclose direct information
on the sizes of the groups that want to work longer or shorter hours.
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hours range in which diﬀerent policies aimed at increasing total working hours
could be fruitful. Moreover, it approximates the scope for policy interventions (the
fraction of a group with h > h0 or h < h0). Our study also implies that the goal
of a supply-stimulating policy should not be to increase the hours worked of all
working women in part-time jobs, as was the goal of the Task Force Part-time Plus
(Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, 2008). Our results imply that there are groups or types of
workers who already prefer to increase the number of hours they work. Stimulating
the supply of labor, in terms of preferred working hours, of these groups would,
of course, be ineﬀective. To be successful, supply-stimulating and other policies
should take into account heterogeneity of the type presented in this study.
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4The impact of changes in the standard workweek
on preferences for labor supply1
4.1 Introduction
Several theories point to the importance of reference eﬀects in labor supply.2 In this
chapter we study whether preferences for work and leisure of (former) West German
civil servants (Beamte) and public sector employees (Angestellte im o¨ﬀentlichen
Dienst) changed in response to reductions and extensions in the length of the
standard workweek. We examine whether changes in the standard working time
in the public sector between 1989 and 2006, which were introduced staggeredly
over time for diﬀerent federal states (Bundesla¨nder), aﬀected stated preferences
for work and leisure. In particular, we estimate a standard labor supply model
in which we model an individual’s preferred working hours as a function of the
standard working time and other determinants of labor supply.
Our results indicate that the variations in the standard workweek signiﬁcantly
1This chapter is based on joint work (in progress) with Thomas Dohmen and Maarten Vendrik.
Earlier drafts of this chapter have been presented at the Conference of the European Association of
Labour Economists (Bonn, Germany, 2012), the Conference of the European Economic Association
(Ma´laga, Spain, 2012), the Conference of the European Society for Population Economics (Bern,
Switzerland, 2012) and the Spring Meeting for Young Economists (Mannheim, Germany, 2012). I
thank participants at these conferences, and Ulf Zo¨litz for discussion and comments. The data used
in this study were extracted using the add-on-package PanelWhiz for Stata. See Haisken-DeNew
and Hahn (2006) for details.
2Examples are preference interdependence (e.g., Blomquist, 1993) and habit formation (e.g.,
Vendrik, 1993).
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changed the preferences with respect to weekly working hours. A reduction in the
standard workweek is followed by a strong contemporaneous decrease in preferred
hours. However, in the subsequent years preferences partly revert back towards
the old level, such that the long-run eﬀect is smaller than the short-run eﬀect.
A workweek extension leads to a gradual increase in preferred weekly working
time. That is, we ﬁnd an asymmetry in the adjustment process of preferred labor
supply for extensions and reductions of standard hours. The identiﬁed eﬀects can
potentially be accounted for by preferences that are subject to habit formation,
preference interdependence, social norms and/or anchoring.3
We structure this chapter as follows. In Section 4.2 we brieﬂy introduce the data
used in this study, after which we discuss in detail the assignment to the standard-
hours regime in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we present descriptive evidence in favor of
preference adjustment following changes in the standard working time. Section 4.5
introduces the econometric model. The estimation results are presented in Section
4.6. In Section 4.7 we perform some robustness checks. Section 4.8 discusses the
results. Section 4.9 presents a short summary and concludes.
4.2 Data
The data used in this study come from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP), waves 1985 to 2009. The dependent variable in our analysis are the
preferred weekly working hours (denoted hp). Preferred-hours data are available
in all waves of the SOEP, except for 1996. Respondents were asked the following
question: “If you could choose your own number of working hours, taking into
account that your income would change according to the number of hours: How
many hours would you want to work?”4 We assume that individuals answer the
question having their contractual hourly wage in mind.5 One might be skeptical
to draw conclusions from subjective data of this kind. However, Euwals et al.
(1998) show that, in addition to qualitative information, self-reported preferred
hours predict future actual hours.
The independent variable of interest is the standard working time. We merge
data on the length of the standard workweek to the SOEP data. State-speciﬁc
information on the length of the workweek of public sector employees was provided
by Ver.di, the labor union in which public sector employees are organized.6
3We discuss these phenomena more in detail during the discussion.
4In the German version of the questionnaire, the question was phrased as follows: “Wenn
Sie den Umfang Ihrer Arbeitszeit selbst wa¨hlen ko¨nnten und dabei beru¨cksichtigen, daß sich Ihr
Verdienst entsprechend der Arbeitszeit a¨ndern wu¨rde: Wie viele Stunden in der Woche wu¨rden
Sie dann am liebsten arbeiten?”
5I calculate the contractual hourly wage as YL
hc∗×4 13
, where YL and hc represent monthly
individual labor earnings and working hours stipulated in the contract, respectively.
6Even if, on the level of collective decision making, the changes in the standard workweek were
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4.2 Data
Figure 4.1: Length of the standard workweek for civil servants and public
sector employees in West-German federal states
Note: This ﬁgures shows the length of the standard workweek for civil servants and public sector employees for
all West-German federal states. For civil servants we present data for the years 1985-2009, whereas for the public
sector employees we present data for the years 1985-2004. Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior and Ver.di.
Information on the length of the standard workweek of civil servants was provided
by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 provide an
overview of these numbers. These reveal that there is a period of shortening of
the standard workweek (1989-1992) followed by a period of lengthening. Prior to
1992 all employees in the public service experienced a reduction in the standard
working time from 40 to 38.5 hours. For civil servants in Schleswig-Holstein the
reduction from 40 to 38.5 hours became eﬀective in April 1990 and for those in
Hesse in April 1991. For all remaining civil servants and all public sector employees
the reductions became eﬀective in a staggered fashion. In April 1989 the full-time
workweek was shortened by one hour to 39 hours. Exactly one year later (April
1990) it was shortened by an additional half hour to a standard full-time workweek
of 38.5 hours. From 1994 civil servants in all states experienced one or several
prolongations of the standard workweek, resulting in a standard workweek of up to
42 hours per week in Hesse and Bavaria.
We restrict our sample to individuals between the ages of 15 and 49 (inclusive)
who are regularly employed as either civil servant or public sector employee. We
exclude employees aged 50 and older from the sample, because these workers are
eligible for special arrangements with respect to weekly hours. Furthermore, we
exclude all individuals in full-time education, individuals with an additional job,
and those who reported (preferred) hours of more than 84 per week (seven times
partially based on individual labor supply preferences they can be regarded as exogenous because
the inﬂuence of each individual’s preference separately on the standard workweek is negligible.
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half a natural day). Finally, we should note that before the year 2000, we are unable
to discriminate between individuals living in Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate.
Since the inhabitants of Saarland constitute only a minor fraction of the sample,
we neglect this issue.
4.3 Assignment to standard-hours regime
The SOEP does not contain information about the standard workweek people are
subject to. We therefore have to assign the correct standard workweek length
to the right individuals. This exercise is hampered by the fact that there can
exist diﬀerences in the standard workweek between people employed at federal
government bodies, states and municipalities. We brieﬂy highlight these diﬀerences
for civil servants and public sector employees in turn.
For civil servants there are diﬀerences in the standard workweek only between those
employed at states and municipalities (Landesbeamte and Kommunalbeamte) on
the one hand, and those employed at the federal level (Bundesbeamte) on the other
hand. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 reveal these diﬀerences. In fact, the timing of workweek
reductions is identical for most civil servants, while the timing of the workweek
extensions after 1994 is not. For example, civil servants employed at the federal level
experienced extensions in the standard workweek in 2004 and 2006, whereas civil
servants employed at several states and municipalities experienced such extensions
in the pre-2004 period already.
Whereas civil servants employed at states and municipalities do not diﬀer with
respect to their standard workweek length, these diﬀerences can be present for
public sector employees. Even though the timing of the 1989-reductions is
identical for all public sector employees, there exist diﬀerences with respect to the
extensions (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Public sector employees employed by federal bodies
experienced a half-an-hour extensions in October 2005, whereas those employed by
states experienced extensions over a year later (November 2006). Public sector
employees employed by municipalities may have been subject to a higher level of
standard hours (up to 40) from October 2005 onwards, depending on bargaining
agreements (not presented in Table 4.2).
Unfortunately, the SOEP data lack information that explicitly indicates whether a
civil servant or public sector employee is employed at a federal body, a state or a
municipality. As a result, we cannot unambiguously assign the relevant standard
workweek to all individuals. Since the vast majority of civil servants is employed
at states/municipalities (German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2011), we maintain the
assumption that all civil servants are subject to the state-level standard-workweek
regulations prevailing in the state they reside in. In fact, we maintain the same
assumption for public sector employees. However, in case of the public sector
employees, the ratio of municipal-to-state employed is about ﬁfty-ﬁfty (German
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Table 4.2: Length of the standard workweek for employees in public service
at the federal and municipal level.
’85-’88 ’89 ’90 ’91-’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07-’09
Civil servants
Federal bodies 40 39 38.5 38.5 4010 40 413 41
Public sector employees
Federal bodies 40 39 38.5 38.5 38.5 3910 39 39
Municipalities 40 39 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5
Note: See note to Table 4.1. From October ﬁrst 2005 onwards there were special rules for public sector employees
employed by municipalities. Depending on negotiations the option exists to extend the workweek to 40 hours per
week.
Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2011). Thus, assuming all employees are subject to the
length of the standard workweek prevalent in a particular state would introduce
considerable noise after 2005. Therefore, we set the variable measuring the length
of the standard workweek to missing for those public sector employees interviewed
in October 2005 and after.7
4.4 Descriptive evidence for preference
adjustment
In Figure 4.2 we present the series of average actual, preferred, standard and
contractual hours (denoted h, hp, hs and hc respectively) for the selected sample.8
Panel (a) presents the series for men and panel (b) presents them for women. The
standard-hours series illustrate the length of one full-time equivalent at the time of
completing the interview. Given that individuals are not interviewed in the same
month and because we average data across several states, the average length of the
standard workweek changes smoothly. The series of actual hours worked is more
erratic. Nevertheless, the co-movement of actual hours and the standard workweek
in Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 suggests that working hours are aﬀected by the standard
workweek.
The pattern in Panel (b) is less clear cut. Comparing the series of female civil
servants and public sector employees, it seems that working time preferences of the
former remain rather stable, whereas preferred hours of the latter group tend to
slope downward. This gradual reduction in preferred working time likely reﬂects
the decreasing propensity for women to work in full-time jobs. About 72 percent of
7Indeed, when we include public sector employees and assume that they are subject to the
length of the standard workweek prevalent in the state, we ﬁnd – as expected – that the eﬀect
size decreases slightly. Yet, the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
8The following questions were used for eliciting the contractual and actual weekly working
hours: “How many hours are stipulated in your contract (excluding overtime)?”, followed by “And
how many hours do your actual working-hours consist of including possible over-time?” Following
the advice of members of the SOEP team, we present the generated actual hours variable.
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women in the public sector in our sample reported to work full-time in 1985. This
fraction gradually fell to 48 percent in 2009.
4.4.1 Reductions in the length of the standard workweek
In Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 we plot the development of the averages of standard and
preferred hours around the time of the reductions in the standard working time.
Because civil servants and public sector employees experienced the change at the
same point in time, we combine the information for both groups in one graph. The
two vertical red lines indicate the years in which most states introduced the shorter
workweek (1989 and 1990). An exception is Hesse. The standard workweek for
Hesse civil servants was reduced only in April 1991. For ease of exposition, we lag
the data series underlying Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 for civil servants in Hesse by one
year (i.e. 1991 becomes 1990; 1990 becomes 1989 etcetera),9 so that the year 1989 in
the ﬁgure corresponds to the year in which the standard workweek was shortened.
Note that Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 plots the average of the standard workweek that
applied to respondents at the time of the interview. Roughly 77 percent of the
respondents to the 1989 wave of the SOEP were interviewed before the change in
the standard workweek became eﬀective (i.e. before April), which causes the entire
change in the standard and actual hours to be visible only in 1990, when the new
standard working hours applied to all respondents.
From Panel (a) we observe that the preferred hours remained quite stable in
the years before the ﬁrst shortening. However, the year after the ﬁrst reduction
became eﬀective we observe a sizable drop in preferred hours. The pattern in
preferred hours revealed in Panel (a) suggests that preferences adjusted to changes
in the standard workweek, at least in the short-run. It seems that preferred hours
gradually increased towards the old level after some years. On the one hand,
such a reversion could reﬂect that preferences are only aﬀected temporarily by a
change in the standard working time. On the other hand, it could reﬂect changing
determinants of labor supply in the underlying sample. Given the development of
the preferred-hours series of male civil servants from the mid-90s onwards, the ﬁrst
explanation seems unlikely, as preferred hours in Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 do not seem
to revert to some old level. Rather, they are correlated over time with standard
and actual hours.
9Of course, strictly speaking we neglect year-speciﬁc eﬀects here. However, this presentation
facilitates the graphical analysis.
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(a) Men
(b) Women
Figure 4.2: Series of standard, actual, contractual and preferred weekly hours,
by gender
Note: In this ﬁgure we present the cross-sectionally averaged preferred and standard hours, along with contractual
and actual hours worked. The time series of civil servants and public sector employees are presented on the left
and right hand side respectively. We assume that an individual living in a certain state is subject to the length of
the standard working time in that state.
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(a) Shortening of standard workweek for Beamte and Angestellte
(b) Lengthening of standard workweek for Beamte
Figure 4.3: The eﬀects of a shortening and lengthening of the standard
workweek
Note: Panel (a) plots the cross-sectionally averaged preferred and standard hours for the period in which all
employees in the public sector experienced a shortening of the standard workweek. The two vertical lines indicate
the years in which the shortenings became eﬀective. The shortening in the standard workweek for Hesse civil
servants occurred only on April 1, 1991. We take this into account by taking a one-year lag of the data series for
civil servants in Hesse (i.e. 1991 becomes 1990; 1990 becomes 1989 etcetera). Panel (b) plots the cross-sectionally
averaged preferred and standard hours for the period in which many civil servants experienced a lengthening in the
length of the standard workweek. Since the extensions did not take eﬀect at the same point in time we construct
a variable that measures the years to and from the extension in standard working time which is measured on the
x-axis.
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4.4.2 Extensions of the standard workweek
Contrary to the reductions, the extensions did not take eﬀect at the same point
in time for all civil servants and public sector employees. In order to compare the
development of the averages of hp and hs after workweek extensions we construct a
variable measuring the years to/from the extension. For all federal states listed in
Table 4.1 we exploit the ﬁrst workweek extension, the increases from 38.5 to either
39.5, 40 or 42 hours. The averages of standard and preferred hours are presented in
Panel (b) of Figure 4.3. In the raw data, the increase in preferred hours seems only
small, relative to the increase in standard hours between t = −1 and t = 1. After
t = 1 average preferred hours decrease towards the level of t = −1. However, note
that Figure 4.3 only represents raw data, and does not take into account background
characteristics.
4.4.3 Reductions and extensions quantiﬁed
In column 1 of Table 4.3 we present the regression coeﬃcients of a ﬁxed-eﬀects
regression of a change in the length of the standard workweek on preferred hours.
We ﬁnd that an increase in the length of the standard workweek is associated with
an increase in preferred hours of about half an hour. In column 2 we allow for
a lagged eﬀect, as is common in the habit-formation literature. We do not ﬁnd
evidence in favor of such an eﬀect, as the coeﬃcient is quantitatively small and
statistically insigniﬁcant.
To test whether preferences adjust diﬀerently to reductions and extensions of the
standard workweek, as Figure 4.3 suggests, we allow for the coeﬃcient on the
standard workweek (hs) to diﬀer between periods of workweek shortenings (i.e.
year ≤ 1993) and periods of expansions of the standard workweek (i.e. year >
1994). The results presented in column 3 of Table 4.3 indicate that both eﬀects are
of comparable magnitude, suggesting that the eﬀect found in column 1 is driven by
reductions as well as extensions.
4.5 Augmented standard labor supply model
In this section we augment the standard labor supply model to test whether
preferred working hours are aﬀected by changes in the standard working time. We
model preferred hours (hp) to linearly dependent on background characteristics (cf.
Hausman and Ruud, 1984) and current and lagged standard hours (hs).10 In the
10Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) estimate a similar model to test for the eﬀect of past hours
worked and hours worked in the reference group on current preferences. In addition, the authors
estimate a participation equation. We focus on a group of workers who faced a change in the
standard working time, and therefore do not estimate a participation equation.
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Table 4.3: The eﬀect of changes in the standard workweek
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: hp hp hp
Standard workweek (hst) 0.48*** 0.38***
(0.12) (0.14)
L.Standard workweek (hst−1) 0.08
(0.13)
hst×1(year≤1993) 0.43***
(0.12)
hst×1(year>1993) 0.45***
(0.12)
Number of observations 18,325 13,125 18,325
Number of individuals 4,106 2,935 4,106
Note: Regression coeﬃcients of a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation of hp on hs without additional controls. The constant
has been suppressed. In column (1) we regress current hp on current hs. In column (2) we allow for a lagged eﬀect
of standard hours, hs(t− 1), on current hp. In column (3) we allow for asymmetric eﬀects. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses
graphical analysis we observed that preferred hours are rather volatile. In Panel
(a) of Figure 4.3, after preferences adjust to the new workweek, they seem to revert
back to the old level. This reversion could simply reﬂect changes in (average)
determinants of labor supply in the sample. It could also be that preferences are –
in the long run – not aﬀected by a change in the standard workweek. To test for
the possibility of reversion, we add lagged hs-terms as explanatory variables in a
stepwise fashion to our basic model, which we specify as
hpit = β0hsit + β
′xit + it, (4.1)
where individual i in period t is subject to the standard workweek of length hs.
The column vector xit contains individual characteristics relevant for labor supply
decisions, a constant, and lagged regressors.11
The contemporaneous eﬀect of a change in the standard workweek in a model
without lagged hs-variables is now easily identiﬁed as ∂hpit
∂hsit
= β0, the coeﬃcient
of the length of the standard workweek. We assume that the error term contains
an individual-speciﬁc component θi: it = θi + νit which captures time-invariant
unobserved factors that aﬀect hpit. The residual νit is assumed to be white noise.
Estimating Model 4.1 with ﬁxed eﬀects eliminates the time-invariant component θi.
11Habit formation models usually only include a lagged term, most often a lagged dependent
variable. This setup implies that one is unable to measure habit formation within a year’s time.
In our case we allow for a contemporaneous eﬀect of hs on hp.
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4.6 Results
In column 1 of Table 4.4 we present the results of the asymmetric model presented in
column 3 of Table 4.3, augmented with control variables.12 Since we want to control
for a time trend, we add age dummies in the estimations, instead of a continuous
age variable. We allow for a separate linear trend for women to reﬂect the gradual
reduction in the propensity to work full-time among women, as discussed earlier.
Including controls in the regression reduces the eﬀect of changes in the standard
workweek on preferred hours by about a third, compared to the model without
controls. That is, a one-hour change in the length of the standard workweek leads
to a change in preferred hours worked of about twenty minutes (0.32 hours) in the
same direction.13
The result from section 4.4.3 suggests that the adjustment process of preferences
is similar for reductions and extensions. Yet, the patterns in Figure 4.3 seem to
diﬀer. To test whether the adjustment processes following extensions and reductions
are the same, we now add lagged hs-terms for both periods (i.e. the period during
which only reductions became eﬀective and the period during which only extensions
became eﬀective). Whenever we include lagged values of the hs-terms, we include
lagged values (of the same lag length) of all other explanatory variables as well.
Since there are no a priori candidates for a suitable lag-length, we perform two
types of lag length selection tests. For both tests we start with a fairly general
model that includes three lags and – in a stepwise fashion – reduce the lag length
until we end up with our preferred speciﬁcation.
In the ﬁrst set of tests we test the signiﬁcance of the lagged explanatory variables
as follows. We run the regression including three lags. We then test the joint
signiﬁcance of all highest-order lagged explanatory variables (null hypothesis:
all highest-order lagged eﬀects are jointly zero), including the hs-terms of that
order. If this test fails to reject the null-hypothesis that lagged variables aﬀect
contemporaneous preferred hours at the 10-percent level, we perform the same test
on the highest-order lagged hs-terms only (null hypothesis: all highest-order lagged
hs-terms are zero). If this test also fails to reject insigniﬁcance (p-value > 0.1) all
highest-order lags are omitted from the model and we repeat the same set of tests
on the resulting model. As a second test we rely on the comparison of the Akaike
and Schwarz Information Criterion (AIC and SIC, respectively) to select between
models.
12The set of control variables included in the estimation consists of the (natural log of) the
wage rate, the other income in the household, education and age dummies, the number of children
below the age of 16 in the household, a dummy variable indicating whether someone lives with a
spouse or not, a linear trend, and a trend interacted with a female dummy.
13Estimating the model with contemporaneous control variables only for females and males
separately indicates that the eﬀects of reductions as well as prolongations are larger for females
(0.31 (p-value < 0.1) and 0.31 (p-value < 0.1) respectively) than for males (0.26 (p-value < 0.05)
and 0.24 (p-value < 0.05) respectively), but less signiﬁcant.
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Both information criteria in the second set of tests favor the model without lags.
According to the tests, the higher-order explanatory variables do not explain enough
variation to justify their inclusion in the model.14 Yet, the ﬁrst set of hypothesis
tests leads to a diﬀerent conclusion. For the model with three lagged explanatory
variables the highest-order lags (jointly), as well as the highest-order lagged hs-
terms in isolation, are insigniﬁcant (p-value > 0.1). However, when estimating
the model with two lags the test rejects the (joint) insigniﬁcance of all highest-
order lagged explanatory variables at conventional signiﬁcance levels. Since the
explanatory variables of interest in the model with second-order lags are signiﬁcant,
we retain the two-lag model as our preferred speciﬁcation. The results of this
estimation are presented in column 3 of Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Main results
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: hp hp hp
hst×1(year≤1993) 0.32*** 0.85*** 0.75**
(0.11) (0.30) (0.31)
hst−1×1(year≤1993) -0.53* -0.17
(0.28) (0.37)
hst−2×1(year≤1993) -0.29
(0.29)
hst×1(year>1993) 0.32*** 0.23 0.05
(0.11) (0.15) (0.16)
hst−1×1(year>1993) 0.07 -0.01
(0.15) (0.16)
hst−2×1(year>1993) 0.23*
(0.14)
Natural log of net hourly wage -2.59*** -2.61*** -2.50***
(0.43) (0.53) (0.65)
Net other income, thousands per week -1.96*** -1.66*** -1.32**
(0.51) (0.46) (0.59)
Unknown education (Yes=1, Vocational is base) -0.21 -0.73 -0.65
(0.48) (0.53) (0.57)
College education (Yes=1, Vocational is base) 2.54*** 0.33 -0.60
(0.65) (0.94) (1.02)
Age < 35 (Yes=1) -0.40 -0.05 -0.27
(0.27) (0.33) (0.38)
Age > 44 (Yes=1) 0.33 0.65** 0.72**
(0.23) (0.29) (0.30)
Children under 16 in household (Yes=1) -2.82*** -1.86*** -1.55***
(0.28) (0.33) (0.36)
Trend 0.07* 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Trend × 1[female] -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.17***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Continued on next page
14From three to zero lags, the AIC and SIC are in turn: 35,754, 35,744, 35,734 and 35,731;
36,038, 35,960, 35,882 and 35,812. To be able to compare the information criteria across diﬀerent
regressions, we estimated the diﬀerent models on only those observations included in the model
containing three lags of all explanatory variables.
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Table 4.4: Main results (continued from previous page)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: hp hp hp
Lives with spouse (Yes=1) -0.92*** -0.30 -0.30
(0.30) (0.32) (0.34)
L.Wage 0.37 0.42
(0.45) (0.56)
L.Other income -0.52 -0.32
(0.59) (0.52)
L.Education unknown 0.65 0.31
(0.56) (0.87)
L.College education 1.59* 1.18
(0.86) (0.93)
L.Age < 35 -0.46 -0.14
(0.33) (0.38)
L.Age > 44 -0.03 0.10
(0.30) (0.30)
L.Children -0.67** -0.30
(0.31) (0.39)
L.Spouse -0.45 -0.11
(0.34) (0.36)
L2.Wage -0.53
(0.56)
L2.Other income -1.29**
(0.51)
L2.Education unknown 0.53
(0.78)
L2.College education 0.49
(0.66)
L2.Age < 35 -0.56
(0.35)
L2.Age > 44 -0.09
(0.30)
L2.Children -0.52
(0.34)
L2.Spouse -0.03
(0.35)
Constant 29.73*** 29.84*** 32.63***
(4.50) (5.40) (6.61)
Number of observations 16,645 11,602 8,471
Number of individuals 3,813 2,660 1,909
Σ hs-terms pre-1993 0.32*** 0.31** 0.29*
Σ hs-terms post-1993 0.32*** 0.31** 0.28*
H0: highest-order lags equal zero (p-value) - 0.08 0.05
Note: Results of a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation of Model 4.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
asterisks ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level.
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(a) Shortening of standard workweek
(b) Lengthening of standard workweek
Figure 4.4: The eﬀects of a shortening and lengthening of the standard
workweek
Note: Using the coeﬃcients estimated in column 3 of Table 4.4 we graphically present the eﬀect of a one-hour
shortening and lengthening in the standard working time on preferred hours worked (keeping everything else
constant).
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According to the two-lags model, a standard workweek reduction (pre-1993) is
followed by a strong drop in preferred hours. However, the contemporaneous
eﬀect (0.75) overshoots the long-run eﬀect, which is just over a third of the
contemporaneous eﬀect and is signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level (0.29; p-value =
0.06). That is, a one-hour reduction in hs leads to a decrease in preferred labor
supply of just under twenty minutes per week.
For extensions of the standard workweek (post-1993) the adjustment process of
preferences looks diﬀerently. In the model with only ﬁrst-order lagged explanatory
variables (column 2 of Table 4.4) there are two positive adjustments. Even though
individually these two eﬀects are insigniﬁcant, the sum of the eﬀects is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level (p-value = 0.08). When considering the model
with an additional set of lags, the second order lagged hs-term is signiﬁcant, yielding
positive and signiﬁcant total eﬀect (p-value = 0.07).
We illustrate the estimated dynamic and asymmetric eﬀects from the preferred
speciﬁcation (column 3 of Table 4.4) of hs on hp in Figure 4.4. Panel (a) plots
the estimated dynamic adjustment for a shortening of the standard workweek, and
illustrates the overshooting of the contemporaneous eﬀect. Similarly, Panel (b)
presents the results of a comparable exercise for a prolongation of the standard
workweek.
4.7 Robustness
The results presented in the previous section can arguably have sources other than
the changes in the standard workweek length. We consider three potential issues,
including selectivity, and show that these issues do not drive the presented results.
4.7.1 Changes in the standard workweek and the
unemployment rate
The reductions in the standard workweek became eﬀective in a period marked by
falling unemployment rates, whereas the extensions became eﬀective in a period of
rising unemployment. One could argue that the changes in the stated preferences
we observe are related to, or explained by, job insecurity. Job insecurity or the
fear of being ﬁred might trigger the desire for precautionary savings. However, we
acknowledge that such an impact is not that plausible, as civil servants cannot be
ﬁred in principle, and job security for public sector employees is high as well.
The results presented in Table 4.5 indicate that eﬀect sizes are smaller than in
the standard model, but are still signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level for the model
without lags and the model with one lag. For the model with two lags the total
eﬀects are not signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level (p-value = 0.14 and p-value = 0.16,
50
4 The impact of changes in the standard workweek on preferences for labor supply
respectively). Note, however, that the contemporaneous eﬀect for the reductions
and the second-order lagged eﬀect for the extensions are still signiﬁcant at the 5-
percent level. The insigniﬁcance of the total eﬀects is due to adding insigniﬁcant
regressors.
4.7.2 Selectivity: Leaving the civil service after workweek
extension?
Especially when considering extensions in the standard workweek one might argue
that the results presented in the previous section could be due to those individuals
who are willing to experience an extension in the standard working time. Civil
servants who are unwilling to undergo such ‘treatment’ select themselves out of
the civil service. To check this potential problem we investigate the behavior of
civil servants in the years 1993-2008, the years in which extensions in the standard
working time took eﬀect.
Exploiting the panel dimension of the SOEP, we create a variable that indicates
whether or not an individual left the civil-servant status during a particular year.
Throughout the 1993-2008 period only a minority of the civil servants, on average
about 13.5 percent each year, left the civil service.15 We regress this indicator on
the length of the standard workweek in the next year. This analysis essentially
answers the question of whether an extension of the standard working time in the
coming year is related to a higher probability of leaving the civil service. The results
of a ﬁxed-eﬀects logit model indicate that the eﬀect of an extension of the standard
workweek is not related to leaving the civil service for civil servants during the year
prior to that change (p-value > 0.1).
4.7.3 Wage endogeneity
An issue left unaddressed up to this point is the endogeneity of the wage rate. The
wage rate can be endogenous for several reasons, like measurement error, reverse
causality and omitted variables. A common approach to tackle the endogeneity-
problem is to employ instrumental variable estimation. A huge body of literature is
concerned with identifying the eﬀects of wage changes on changes in hours worked.
Identiﬁcation in that strand of the literature usually relies on a natural experiment,
like changes in the marginal tax rate (e.g., Ashenfelter et al., 2010; Blundell et al.,
1998; Bosch and Van Der Klaauw, 2012). Because identifying the true eﬀect of
wages on preferred hours is not the aim of the current study, and because of lack of
an appropriate instrument, we approach the problem in a pragmatic way without
employing instrumental-variable techniques. We instead use simulation techniques
15The minimum and maximum are 8.8 percent (1993 and 1996) and 15.6 percent (2002)
respectively.
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to map out the sensitivity of the eﬀect of changes in the standard working hours on
preferred working hours to plausible values of the elasticity of labor supply.16 That
is, we analyze how sensitive the estimated coeﬃcient of the length of the standard
workweek is to changes in the elasticity of labor supply.
When estimating Model 4.1, the long-run elasticity of labor supply (η) is given by
η = βwage
̂hp
, where βwage is the coeﬃcient of the wage rate in Model 4.1 and ĥp is
the overall average of preferred hours in the sample. We start by estimating the
standard model without lagged values and ﬁxing the coeﬃcient at several plausible
values for the elasticity of labor supply, η. We rely on the work of Evers et al.
(2008) to select the range of elasticities. Evers et al. (2008) perform a meta-analysis
of uncompensated labor supply elasticities. The authors gathered 107 elasticity
estimates (for males) from 19 diﬀerent studies, not relying on OLS for identiﬁcation,
and reported elasticities in the range [-0.24; 0.45].17 Only one study on German
data was included (Bonin et al., 2003), which found an elasticity of 0.02 for men
and 0.03 for women. This compares to an elasticity of η = −2.59
38
= −0.07 found in
our estimations.
We proceed as follows. For each possible elasticity between -0.25 and +0.45 (with
0.05-increments), we calculate the associated coeﬃcient βwage and estimate Model
4.1 ﬁxing the wage coeﬃcient at this level. In case of an elasticity of, for example,
η = 0.15, this means that we ﬁx the coeﬃcient βwage at η×ĥp ≈ 0.15×38 = 5.7, and
estimate the other parameters of the model accordingly. We ﬁnd that even if the
true elasticity is η = −0.25, which is more than three times the size of the elasticity
we ﬁnd, the aforementioned coeﬃcient estimates are signiﬁcant at the 5-percent
level for reductions (p-value = 0.02) as well as for extensions (p-value = 0.02). For
all elasticities above -0.25 both coeﬃcients of interest are always signiﬁcant at the
1-percent level and lie roughly between 0.2 and 0.7.
From this exercise we can conclude that – for any reasonable value of the
elasticity of labor supply – there is a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of the length of
the standard workweek on preferred hours per week. If anything, our βˆwage might
be underestimated because of reverse causality running from hp to the wage rate.18
16We experimented with one instrumental variable in the standard model; the average wage rate
in a certain reference group. Results remained quantitatively similar, but were just insigniﬁcant
when allowing for asymmetric dynamic adjustments. Once including lags, instruments were too
weak. Indeed, it is debatable to what extent the average wage rate in a reference group is a
suitable instrument. In particular, it is questionable to what extent the exclusion restriction
holds. A proper instrument does not have a direct inﬂuence on the dependent variable. In
this case an increase in the average wage of a reference category could increase consumption in
the reference category, which might in turn increase preferred consumption of other individuals,
leading to higher preferred hours.
17Note that a recent and accurate estimate of -0.2 (Ashenfelter et al., 2010) is also included in
this range.
18An increase in preferred hours may lead to an increase in contractual and actual hours, and
might therefore reduce the average wage rate.
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Table 4.5: Results from standard model including the unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: hp hp hp
hst×1(year≤1993) 0.23** 0.70** 0.63**
(0.11) (0.30) (0.32)
hst−1×1(year≤1993) -0.43 -0.27
(0.29) (0.37)
hst−2×1(year≤1993) -0.12
(0.31)
hs×1(year>1993) 0.22* 0.18 0.01
(0.11) (0.16) (0.17)
hst−1×1(year>1993) 0.08 -0.08
(0.15) (0.16)
hst−2×1(year>1993) 0.31**
(0.15)
Number of observations 16,645 11,602 8,471
Number of individuals 3,813 2,660 1,909
Σ hs-terms pre-1993 0.23** 0.27* 0.24
Σ hs-terms post-1993 0.22* 0.26* 0.23
H0: all lags in model equal zero (p-value) - 0.12 0.02
Note: Results for the standard model including state-speciﬁc unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level. Only
the variables of interest to our analysis are presented.
4.8 Discussion of results: Reference eﬀects
The question remains what channels could explain the eﬀects uncovered in this
study. As brieﬂy outlined above, there are at least four mechanisms that could
account for the eﬀects found in this study. These mechanisms will be discussed in
turn.
First, habit-formation models can be viewed as reference-eﬀects models in which
preferences depend on past behavior and in which past behavior acts as a reference
point. Habit formation models originate from the theory of consumer behavior,19
but the concept has been introduced in labor supply as well.
Models of habit formation typically explain current preferences and/or behavior by
past behavior of the individual. Bover (1991) models the disutility of hours worked
by (hit − αhi,t−1), where hit measures the number of hours worked by individual
19See the work of Duesenberry (1949). Pollak (1970), amongst others, formalized this concept
and proposes that utility derived from a certain level of consumption of a good depends on the
“necessary” (p.749) quantity – either psychologically or physiologically – of that good, which
in turn could depend on past consumption. Campbell and Deaton (1989) and Fuhrer (2000)
showed that consumers adjust consumption slower following changes in lifetime resources than
is explained by the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957; Hall, 1978). Abel (1990),
Constantinides (1990) and Jermann (1998) concluded that habit formation can explain the equity
premium puzzle as identiﬁed by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Carroll et al. (2000) found that the
fact that a higher growth rate leads to more savings can be reconciled with the theory if one allows
for habit formation in consumption. See also the discussion in Frederick et al. (2002).
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i in period t. The parameter α measures the strength of the habit-persistence
mechanism. All else equal, higher labor supply in the past leads to stronger
preferences for work through a reduction in the disutility of working. The results
found in the current study could potentially be explained by a habit-formation
mechanism, as a change in the standard working time aﬀects actual working hours.
The subsequent change in behavior, working longer or shorter hours, would induce
a change in reported preferred hours in the same direction.20
The evidence in favor of habit formation in labor supply models is not overwhelming.
Johnson and Pencavel (1984) investigated the dependence of current on past hours
worked as well, but did not take into account the correlation between the lagged
dependent variable – the independent variable of interest – and the error term.
Bover (1991) did take into account the correlation between the lagged dependent
variable and the error term and found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of past on current hours,
but the exogeneity of the instrument set was not questioned. Moreover, she does not
have information on preferred hours. Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) estimated the
eﬀect of past working hours on current preferred hours and ﬁnd an economically
and statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. However, the authors were unable to
control for unobserved heterogeneity as they only have two years of data.
The second possible channel through which preferences could be aﬀected by the
change in the standard working time is preference interdependence. If preferences
with respect to labor supply depend on behavior of a certain reference group,
preferences might not change because one’s own behavior changes (i.e. habit
formation), but because the observed behavior of colleagues changes.21 Even if
someone in ﬁrst instance does not want to work longer hours after a workweek
extension, preferred hours may yet adjust upward because the colleagues are
observed to work longer hours. If that is the case, preferences for hours worked might
depend on a function of the hours worked by colleagues, or another reference group
(Blomquist, 1993). This channel is comparable to the spillover eﬀect described
in Grodner and Kniesner (2006). In case of the spillover (or social-utility) eﬀect,
the utility function includes an interaction between the decision variable, h in case
of Grodner and Kniesner, and the average number of hours worked in a certain
reference group. As a result, preferences for working longer hours are stronger if
the average hours worked in the reference group is high.
Third, the standard workweek itself may act as a social norm which individuals
internalize in their utility function. An example would be the conformity eﬀect
analyzed by Grodner and Kniesner (2006). In their model the extent to which
someone deviates from a social norm yields disutility, on top of the disutility of
hours worked that is commonly assumed (see also Vendrik, 2003). A plausible social
norm is the standard working time itself, at least for full-time workers. Changes in
20See Vendrik (1993) for a theoretical model of habit formation.
21Weinberg et al. (2004) found that neighborhood characteristics aﬀect individual hours worked.
Maurin and Moschion (2009) found that mothers are more likely to participate on the labor market
if other mothers in the neighborhood also participate.
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the standard workweek then imply that the social norm some people would like to
adhere to alters. Therefore, a change in the length of the standard workweek could
aﬀect preferred working hours.
The fourth possible explanation for an eﬀect of standard hours on preferred hours
is anchoring in answering behavior. A plausible anchor in our case is the length
of the standard workweek, as it is a potentially salient reference point. A change
in this anchor could change stated preferences into the same direction. Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) show how an arbitrary reference point can aﬀect individual
decision making. The length of the standard workweek should in principle be
arbitrary with respect to working time preferences. That is, in the standard model
it does not aﬀect the optimum of preferred hours.
Given that the data we have at our disposal is not experimental in nature, we
are unable to pin down the exact mechanism(s) that account(s) for the eﬀects we
detected in our analysis. Rather, the study presents evidence that a change in the
standard working time aﬀects preferred working hours, which in turn suggests that
reference eﬀects like the ones discussed above do inﬂuence working time preferences.
4.9 Summary and concluding remarks
In this study we have investigated to what extent preferred working hours are
subject to reference eﬀects by estimating the eﬀect of a change in standard working
time on preferences for labor supply of West-German civil servants and public sector
employees. The results indicate that the length of the standard workweek has a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant long-term eﬀect on the preferred weekly working
hours. The eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant as well. Our estimates of the long-term
eﬀect suggest that a one-hour reduction/extension in the standard weekly working
hours leads to about a twenty-minute drop/increase in the preferred working time.
Even though the long-term eﬀect on standard working time on preferred hours
is similar for extensions and reductions in the standard workweek, the estimates
show that the dynamic adjustment of preferences following a prolongation of the
standard workweek is diﬀerent from the adjustment following a cut. We ﬁnd that
individuals subject to an expansion of standard hours slowly adjust their preferred
hours upwards over the two-year period following the change. When confronted
with a reduction of standard working hours, preferred hours dropped immediately
by almost as many hours as the reduction was. However, in the two years after the
reduction, preferences partly reverted back to the old level. The initial response is
almost three times as high as the long-term response. This ﬁnding indicates that
individuals preferences are aﬀected diﬀerently by ‘good’ and ‘bad’ changes.22
22 Di Tella et al. (2010) found that the level of reported happiness reacts diﬀerently (in the
short term) to positive and negative shocks in income. However, the eﬀect is economically small.
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The fact that the current length of the standard workweek has a strong eﬀect
on individual preferences is especially interesting in light of the standard habit
formation literature. The habit formation literature usually attempts to identify
the eﬀect of past behavior on current behavior or preferences. When working with
survey data, the ‘past’ is usually about a year ago. Indeed, when we estimate the
classical labor supply model without a contemporaneous hs-term term and without
allowing for any asymmetries (i.e. removing the contemporaneous term in column
2 of Table 4.3), we ﬁnd that hst−1 has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on preferred
hours (0.38; p-value < 0.01). This may be interpreted as habit formation. Yet,
once we control for current standard hours (column 2 of Table 4.3), the eﬀect of the
lagged term vanishes.
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5Interdependent preferences in labor supply1
5.1 Introduction
Over the past 25 years people working in the German public sector experienced
several changes in the length of their standard workweek. In Chapter 4, we
documented that these changes aﬀected individual preferences for work and leisure.
However, the analysis in the previous chapter leaves open through which channel,
or channels, preferences are shaped.2 One of the potential channels is preference
interdependence with respect to hours worked. That is, individuals may prefer to
work longer hours following an increase in the standard workweek because they
observe their co-workers working longer hours.3 In this chapter we attempt to
empirically isolate the eﬀect of co-workers’ labor supply decisions on individual
labor supply preferences.
Interdependent preferences in labor supply are of interest to policymakers since
changes in policy variables may not only have a direct eﬀect on the target group,
but can also change the preferences of individuals who are not directly aﬀected by
1I thank my supervisors Thomas Dohmen and Maarten Vendrik for extensive discussions and in-
depth advice they gave my while writing this chapter (paper in progress). I also thank participants
at the Nederlandse ArbeidsmarktDag (The Hague, 2013) for their comments. The data used in
this study were extracted using the add-on-package PanelWhiz for Stata. See Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn (2006) for details.
2That is, for individuals who face a change in the standard working hours it is diﬃcult to
disentangle the diﬀerent eﬀects.
3The idea that imitative behavior aﬀects decision making has been voiced earlier in the
theoretical literature (e.g., Blomquist, 1993).
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the policy. For example, a policy that aﬀects labor supply decisions of individual
i, might inﬂuence the preferences for work and leisure of i’s colleague j who is
not directly aﬀected by the policy. In this study, we aim to identify whether such
spillover eﬀects of policy exist because of interdependent preferences.
We assume that preferred working time depends on the actual hours worked by
colleagues, which seems to be a plausible assumption (cf. Mayraz et al. (2009)
and Clark and Senik (2010) for the case of income comparisons). We identify the
eﬀect of co-workers’ hours on individual preferences by relying on the particular
composition of the workforce in the German public sector, which consists of public
sector employees and civil servants. These two types of workers are often co-workers
and may even perform the same tasks. Between 1993 and 2005 civil servants
(Beamte) experienced several prolongations of the standard workweek, changing the
hours they worked (see Chapter 4). We assess empirically whether these changes
aﬀected the preferred working hours of public sector employees (Angestellte im
o¨ﬀentlichen Dienst), whose standard workweek was not prolonged.
We ﬁnd that the changes in the working hours of civil servants signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
preferences for labor supply of public sector employees. Our estimates indicate that
a one-hour increase in average hours worked by civil servants induced a preference
among public sector employees for working about two-thirds of an hour more per
week. As the analysis below casts some doubt on the exclusion restriction of the
instrumental variable, we also estimate a reduced-form model. In this reduced-
form estimation we ﬁnd that a one-hour increase in the standard workweek of civil
servants leads to a quarter of an hours increase in the preferred working time of
public sector employees.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we ﬁrst discuss the
literature that is closely related to the current study. In Section 5.3 we analyze
the concept of preference interdependence in more detail and elaborate on how it
is identiﬁed. In Section 5.4 the data are presented, after which the results are
presented in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6 we discuss the validity of the exclusion
restriction of the instrumental variable. Section 5.7 discusses the results and
concludes.
5.2 Literature
A considerable body of literature has been devoted to the analysis of interdependent
preferences in labor supply. In this section we give a brief overview of the literature
that is most related to our study. The idea of preference interdependence originates
from the consumption literature (e.g., Duesenberry (1949)). In this strand of the
literature it is argued that current preferences for consumption depend on other
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people’s consumption patterns.4 Clearly, changes in preferences for consumption
can aﬀect labor supply decisions, as individuals trade-oﬀ leisure and consumption.
Apart from this indirect eﬀect of preference interdependence on labor supply, a
diﬀerent strand of literature considers how the labor supply decisions of others
aﬀect an individual’s preferences for work and leisure.
Blomquist (1993) and Vendrik (1998) developed theoretical models in which an
individual’s working hours depend on the average number of hours worked in a
particular reference group. Blomquist (1993) argues that models that neglect
this eﬀect cannot accurately predict the eﬀects of a tax change on labor supply;
and Vendrik (1998) provides an explanation for the growth in female labor force
participation. Grodner and Kniesner (2006) theoretically investigated the eﬀects
of spillover and conformity in a model of labor supply. The authors conclude that
the neglect of endogenous social interactions leads to biases in the estimation of the
elasticity of labor supply.
Maurin and Moschion (2009) empirically investigated labor force participation along
the extensive margin and found that mothers who live in a neighborhood with many
working mothers are more likely to work themselves. Similarly, Weinberg et al.
(2004) showed that the number of actual hours worked is related to neighborhood
characteristics, like the employment rate of adult men. In line with that, Grodner
and Kniesner (2008) found that hours worked by individuals are related to those
worked by an economically and geographically close reference group. It is not
clear, however, whether this correlation is the result of a causal impact of such
reference groups on individuals’ labor supply decisions. In fact, their estimates
imply unreasonably large eﬀects, which only become plausible when a lag of
individual hours worked is included in the regression.5 Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998)
incorporated survey information on reference groups and estimated a standard
labor supply model. The authors concluded that preference interdependence
contributes signiﬁcantly to explaining preferences for labor supply. However, when
allowing for habit formation, by controlling for lagged hours worked, the preference-
interdependence eﬀect is insigniﬁcant. Moreover, the authors are unable to allow
for individual heterogeneity.
5.3 Identiﬁcation of interdependent preferences
In this chapter we attempt to identify the eﬀect of the hours worked by co-workers
on the stated preferences for hours worked of individuals (hp). We assume that the
4In the model of Pollak (1976) and Kapteyn (1977) the parameters of the utility function vary
with other people’s consumption patterns.
5As the lagged dependent variable is not instrumented (see also Bover, 1991), and since
the authors do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, it is likely that the results represent
correlations rather than causal eﬀects. A potential alternative explanation of the results could be
the heterogeneity in economic activity across regions, which is not controlled for by the authors.
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preferred working hours of individual i generally depend on the hours worked by
all members j = i of a reference group ri, as well as a vector xit, which captures
(other) observable determinants of labor supply, and an unobserved individual-
speciﬁc eﬀect.
hpit = β0f
({hjt|j ∈ ri})+ β′xit + it. (5.1)
It is common to assume that the term f
({hjt|j ∈ ri}) equals the average hours
worked in the reference group, h¯ri .
6 Variation in this average only identiﬁes
preference interdependence if it is not driven by factors that also directly aﬀect
hpit. For example, a sudden increase in the workload that causes an increase
in hours worked across the board might also have a direct eﬀect on everybody’s
preferred hours (e.g., through habit formation), and would hence introduce a
spurious correlation between average hours and individual preferred hours.7
To solve this problem we exploit the fact that the German public sector employs
two diﬀerent types of workers: civil servants who faced extensions in their standard
workweek during 1993-2005 and public sector employees whose standard workweek
remained unchanged at 38.5 hours. We investigate whether changes in the average
working hours of civil servants that were induced by changes in their standard
workweek, aﬀected the preferences of public sector employees in a particular state
and year. These workweek extensions were introduced to reduce labor costs in the
longer term and did not seem to be directly related to a sudden economic shock
that might have aﬀected individual desired hours as well.8
We operationalize h¯ri by the average hours worked by civil servants in a particular
state and year (h¯CS), and instrument this average with the standard workweek
maintained in that particular state and year. Under the maintained assumption
that the changes in the standard workweek of civil servants did not directly aﬀect
the working time preferences of public sector employees, this approach identiﬁes
preference interdependence.
Figure 5.1 shows that civil servants working at the state level experienced several
changes in the standard workweek. The standard workweek of civil servants working
at the federal level evolved diﬀerently.9 The latter group saw one single increase
in standard hours from 38.5 to 40 in October 2004. Unfortunately, we do not
know whether public sector employees work at the state or at the federal level.
6See, for example, the overview of the social-comparison literature by Clark et al. (2008).
7This is a subtle variant of the ‘reﬂection problem’ as discussed by Manski (1993).
8This reason is stated in an email received from one of the state ministries: “...hatte
die Verla¨ngerung der Wochenarbeitszeit ... haushalterische Gru¨nde. Bei gleichbleibendem
Einkommen standen insgesamt mehr Arbeitsstunden zur Verfu¨gung. Dieser Arbeitszeitgewinn
fu¨r den Dienstherrn konnte (allerdings auf la¨ngere Sicht) fu¨r Personaleinsparungen in Ho¨he des
Arbeitszeit-Gegenwertes genutzt werden.”
9For an elaborate discussion about the assignment to the standard-hours regimes, see Section
4.3.
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Consequently, we do not know whether their colleagues work at the state level
(Landesbeamte) or at the federal level (Bundesbeamte). We treat our data as if
all employees and civil servants are employed at the state level, implying that the
relevant reference group (ri in h¯ri) are all the civil servants in the same state and
year. This probably leads to an underestimate of the true eﬀect.
Figure 5.1: Length of the standard workweek for civil servants in West-
German federal states.
Note: This ﬁgure shows the length of the standard workweek for civil servants for all West-German federal states.
Note that before 2000 the SOEP does not discriminate between individuals living in Saarland and Rhineland-
Palatinate. Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior. The documents used to construct this ﬁgure are available
from the authors upon request.
5.4 Data
The data used in this paper come from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP), waves 1993 to 2005.10 The sample is restricted to employees in the public
sector who are between the ages of 15 and 59 (inclusive). We exclude all individuals
in full-time education, individuals with an additional job, and those who reported
(preferred) hours of more than 84 per week (seven times half a natural day). Finally,
we should note that before the year 2000, we are unable to discriminate between
individuals living in Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate. Since the inhabitants of
Saarland constitute only a minor fraction of the sample, we neglect this issue.
The dependent variable in the analyses below is the preferred hours worked per
10The data were extracted using the add-on-package PanelWhiz for Stata. See Haisken-DeNew
and Hahn (2006) for details.
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5 Interdependent preferences in labor supply
week (denoted hp), which is available in all waves, except for 1996.11 Respondents
were asked the following question: “If you could choose your own number of working
hours, taking into account that your income would change according to the number
of hours: How many hours would you want to work?”.12 We assume that individuals
answer the question with their contractual hourly wage in mind.13
In this study we estimate the eﬀect of average hours worked by civil servants
on preferences for labor supply of public sector employees. These average hours
are computed for each year and state using the following variable in the SOEP:
“And how many hours do your actual working hours consist of including possible
overtime?”.14 The source of variation in the average hours of civil servants that we
exploit in this study is changes in the standard workweek of civil servants. These
changes are presented in Table 5.1. We received information on the length of the
standard workweek of civil servants from the Federal Ministry of the Interior.
5.5 Results
In column (1) of Table 5.2 we present the parameter estimates of an instrumental
variable (IV) estimation of model 5.1. We instrument the average hours worked by
civil servants with their standard workweek. The results indicate that the average
hours worked by civil servants signiﬁcantly and positively aﬀect the working time
preferences of public sector employees. A one-hour increase in average hours of civil
servants increases the preferred working hours of public sector employees by about
two-thirds of an hour (s.e. = 0.25; p-value < 0.01).15
The ﬁrst-stage regression results are presented in column (2). The Kleibergen-
Paap F-statistic in column (2) indicates that the estimates do not suﬀer from the
weak-instrument problem, as it is well above 10.
Even though the focus in column (1) is on average hours worked by civil servants
(h¯CS), preferences of public sector employees hp can potentially be aﬀected by
the average hours worked of other public sector employees (h¯PSE) as well. Yet, if
11One might be skeptical to draw conclusions from subjective data of the kind presented here.
However, Euwals et al. (1998) showed that, in addition to qualitative information, using desired
hours helps to predict future actual hours.
12In the German version of the questionnaire, the question was phrased as follows: “Wenn
Sie den Umfang Ihrer Arbeitszeit selbst wa¨hlen ko¨nnten und dabei beru¨cksichtigen, daß sich Ihr
Verdienst entsprechend der Arbeitszeit a¨ndern wu¨rde: Wie viele Stunden in der Woche wu¨rden
Sie dann am liebsten arbeiten?”
13We calculate the contractual hourly wage as YL
hc∗×4 13
, where YL and hc represent monthly
individual labor earnings and contractual weekly working hours, respectively.
14The original, German, phrasing of the question read as follows: “Und wieviel betra¨gt im
Durchschnitt Ihre tatsa¨chliche Arbeitszeit einschließlich eventueller U¨berstunden?”
15In unreported results we did not ﬁnd any evidence for dynamic/lagged eﬀects of the average
hours worked on individual preferences. In these results we followed the same approach as in the
previous chapter.
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preference-interdependence eﬀects are at play, h¯PSE can be considered a mediating
variable for the eﬀect of h¯CS on hp, and hence a bad control (in the sense of
Angrist and Pischke (2008)), and should therefore not be included as an explanatory
variable in column (1). Consider the prolongations in the standard workweek of civil
servants that raise their average working hours. If such increases positively impact
the preferred hours of public sector employees, they may adjust working hours
accordingly. Indeed, in an IV regression similar to the one presented in column
(1) of Table 5.2 we ﬁnd that the average hours of civil servants, instrumented
by the length of their standard workweek, has a positive eﬀect on the average
hours of public sector employees (0.57; s.e. = 0.05; p-value < 0.01). We therefore
exclude the average h¯PSE from the regression in column (1). Consequently, the
total eﬀect of 0.67 presented in column (1) of Table 5.2 reﬂects the total preference-
interdependence impact of a direct eﬀect of a change in h¯CS on hp as well as an
indirect eﬀect of that change in h¯CS through h¯PSE on hp.
5.6 Validity of the exclusion restriction of the
instrumental variable
In the above IV speciﬁcation we maintain the assumption that the standard
workweek of civil servants does not have a direct eﬀect on the preferred working
time of public sector employees. That is, the standard workweek should fulﬁll
the exclusion restriction for instrumental variables. We now investigate how the
previous result changes once we relax this assumption. Relaxing the exclusion
restriction implies that we allow the standard workweek of civil servants to have
a direct eﬀect on preferred hours of public sector employees, rather than only
through the average hours worked by civil servants. A positive eﬀect of the standard
workweek of civil servants on the preferred hours of public sector employees casts
doubt on whether the standard workweek is a suitable instrument in this analysis.
The results from a ﬁxed-eﬀects OLS regression in column (3) of Table 5.2 indicate
that changes in the standard workweek of civil servants have a marginally signiﬁcant
(p-value = 0.07) direct eﬀect on the preferred working time of public sector
employees. The eﬀect of the average hours worked by civil servants is comparable in
size but signiﬁcant even at the 5-percent level. It indicates that a one-hour increase
in the average hours worked by civil servants increases the preferred hours of public
sector employees by about one-ﬁfth of an hour. However, this OLS estimate of
average hours (0.19; s.e. = 0.08) is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient
of average hours in the IV regression (0.67; s.e. = 0.25) in column (1). The result
that hsCS has a signiﬁcant impact on hp suggests the exclusion restriction is not
satisﬁed. However, this combination of results from the OLS regression should be
interpreted with some caution for at least two reasons.
On the one hand, approximating the average hours worked in the true reference
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Table 5.2: Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: hp h¯CS hp hp
Average hours of civil servants (h¯CS) 0.67*** 0.19**
(0.25) (0.08)
Standard workweek civil servants (hsCS) 0.39*** 0.19* 0.26***
(0.02) (0.10) (0.10)
Natural log of hourly wage -2.39*** -0.19** -2.48*** -2.51***
(0.49) (0.08) (0.57) (0.57)
Other income, thousands per week -2.49*** -0.15 -2.56*** -2.59***
(0.45) (0.10) (0.53) (0.53)
Education unknown 0.73 0.04 0.75 0.76
(0.52) (0.15) (0.62) (0.62)
College education 3.89*** -0.37 3.71*** 3.64***
(0.98) (0.26) (1.36) (1.36)
Age < 35 -0.38 -0.05 -0.41 -0.41
(0.36) (0.08) (0.40) (0.40)
Age > 44 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.06
(0.32) (0.08) (0.36) (0.36)
Person lives with spouse -1.62*** 0.04 -1.61*** -1.60***
(0.39) (0.07) (0.44) (0.44)
Children under 16 in household (if 1) -2.93*** 0.06 -2.90*** -2.89***
(0.35) (0.07) (0.47) (0.48)
Trend 0.07 -0.00 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Trend × 1[Female] -0.23*** -0.01 -0.23*** -0.23***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Number of observations 8,462 8,462 8,462 8,462
Number of individuals 2,490 2,490 2,490 2,490
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic - 438 - -
Note: Column (1) presents the results of a ﬁxed-eﬀects instrumental variable regression of preferred hours of public
sector employees on average hours worked of civil servants. Column (2) presents the corresponding ﬁrst-stage
regression results. Robust standard errors are presented between parentheses. Column (3) presents the results of
a ﬁxed-eﬀects OLS regression of preferred hours on average working hours of civil servants, including the standard
workweek of civil servants as an additional explanatory variable. Column (4) presents the reduced-form of the eﬀect
of the standard working time of civil servants on the preferred hours of public sector employees. Robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent
level, respectively.
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group of civil servants by the average hours worked of civil servants living in the
same state/year potentially inﬂicts a downward bias on the estimated coeﬃcient
(βh¯CS), because of random measurement error in h¯CS. This downward bias then
inﬂicts an upward bias upon βhsCS . Such an upward bias in the estimate of βhsCS
indicates that the true eﬀect of the standard workweek on preferred hours would be
weaker than presented in column (3) of Table 5.2. A strong bias would then imply
that the exclusion restriction might still hold.
On the other hand, as discussed in Section 5.3, the OLS coeﬃcient of average
hours worked (βh¯CS) may suﬀer from spurious correlation between h¯CS and hp,
which is likely to inﬂict a positive bias on βh¯CS . If such a bias exists, the OLS
coeﬃcient might in fact be an overestimate of the (potentially insigniﬁcant) true
eﬀect. Because of the positive correlation between h¯CS and hsCS, the coeﬃcient of
the standard workweek in the OLS regression in column (3) of Table 5.2 (βhsCS)
is potentially biased towards zero. It would therefore be a lower-bound estimate,
suggesting that the true βhsCS is potentially stronger and more signiﬁcant than
presented here, falsifying the exclusion restriction maintained in the instrumental
variable approach with more certainty.
If the exclusion restriction does not hold, changes in the standard workweek likely
aﬀect preferences through other channels than via average hours worked.16 Even
though a direct eﬀect of the excluded instrument on the dependent variable hampers
the identiﬁcation of the preference-interdependence eﬀect as investigated up to this
point (i.e. the eﬀect of average hours on preferences), it is still interesting to estimate
the reduced-form total eﬀect of the change in the standard workweek (hsCS) on the
preferences for work and leisure of the public sector employees. The results of this
regression are presented in column (4) of Table 5.2. The estimate of βhsCS suggests
that a one-hour increase in the standard workweek of civil servants leads to a quarter
of an hour increase in the preferred working time of public sector employees.
5.7 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this chapter we exploit the particular composition of the workforce in the German
public sector in an attempt to identify the eﬀect of average hours worked by co-
workers on an individual’s preferred number of hours worked. The workforce in
the German public sector consists of two types of workers: public sector employees
and civil servants. The particular feature of the German public sector is that these
two types of workers are often co-workers and can even perform the same tasks. A
diﬀerence between the two groups of workers is the length of the standard workweek.
During the 1993-2005 period the standard hours of public sector employees remained
16As discussed in the previous chapter we argued that the standard working time an individual
is subject to can act as a social norm individuals might want to adhere to. The standard workweek
of civil servants might act as a similar social norm.
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constant at 38.5 hours per week, whereas the standard workweek of civil servants
was lengthened from 38.5 hours in 1993 to 40-42 hours per week by the end of
the sample period. These policy changes provide a quasi-experimental design that
oﬀers the opportunity to estimate the eﬀect of changes in co-worker’s working hours
on individual preferences for work and leisure. To the best of our knowledge, this
study is the ﬁrst to exploit variation in the standard workweek in an attempt to
identify preference interdependence.
We estimate a standard labor supply model in which we allow preferences for labor
supply of a public sector employee to depend on the average hours worked of the civil
servants in the same state/year. The average-hours variable in turn is instrumented
using the length of the standard workweek. The results in Table 5.2 suggest that the
changes in standard and average hours worked of civil servants signiﬁcantly impacts
the preferred hours of public sector employees. A one-hour increase in the average
hours worked of civil-servants increases desired hours of public sector employees by
about two-thirds of an hour.
Two points of discussion when employing instrumental variable techniques are the
absence of spurious correlation between the instrument and the dependent variable,
as well as the validity of the exclusion restriction of the instrument. With respect
to the ﬁrst point one usually relies on assumptions. In this study, changes in
the instrument did not seem to be related to an economic shock that might have
simultaneously aﬀected the dependent variable in our analysis. With respect to the
second point we performed an additional check. The results of this additional
analysis, an OLS regression with the excluded instrument added as regressor,
indicate that the exclusion restriction of the instrument may not hold. Since the
coeﬃcients estimated by this OLS regression might suﬀer from upward as well as
downward biases, we also presented the results of a reduced-form estimation in
which the preferred hours of public sector employees are regressed on the standard
workweek of civil servants. These results suggest that a one-hour increase in the
standard workweek of civil servants leads to a quarter of an hour increase in the
preferred working time of public sector employees. This total eﬀect may consist of
a direct eﬀect of the standard workweek on individual preferences, as well as the
indirect eﬀect of a change in the standard working time through the average hours
of civil servants.
67

6Conclusion and discussion
In this thesis we investigate the heterogeneity in working time preferences and their
formation. In this concluding chapter we summarize, discuss and reﬂect on the
ﬁndings.
6.1 Chapter 2
The aim of Chapter 2 is twofold. First, it presents an overview of the heterogeneity
in the desire to change weekly working hours by applying regression analysis
techniques. Second, it incorporates the ﬁndings of this heterogeneity analysis and
formulates an implication for policy aimed at increasing the working hours among
working women in the Netherlands.
The results from the heterogeneity analysis indicate that there is a sizable group of
part-time-working women who would like to increase their weekly working hours,
mainly women who perform semi- or unskilled manual labor and women with lower
education levels. At the same time, a large group of women would prefer to reduce
their weekly working hours. This second group consists mainly of highly educated
women.
The particular structure of the heterogeneity with respect to the discrepancy
between actual and preferred hours suggests a fruitful route for policymakers who
would like to induce women to work longer hours. We suggest that policy could
be tailored towards those women who are already willing to work longer hours as
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their preferences do not need to be altered in order to facilitate an increase in hours
worked.
If we target policy towards those already willing work more hours, how large of an
eﬀect on participation could we expect? The size of a potential increase is hard
to quantify exactly. Yet, we ﬁnd that about six percent of the 2010-wave consists
of working women with a lower level of educational attainment1 who would like
to increase their working hours. An additional 1.5 percent of the sample performs
manual work and prefers to increase their weekly working hours. These two groups
together form over 7 percent of the sample and would prefer to increase their
workweek by about 7 hours. Given the length of their current workweek of slightly
more than 18 hours, this would represent a substantial increase in working hours
for a substantial fraction of the sample.
6.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3 we explain the implication of heterogeneity in the desire to
change weekly working hours from a diﬀerent angle. Instead of putting the
focus on heterogeneity between diﬀerent groups of employees, we investigate the
heterogeneity with respect to the desire to reduce working hours within groups of
individuals sharing a comparable set of characteristics. Several previous studies
show that there is a strong correlation between the number of hours worked and
the desire to change weekly working hours. Namely, those who work longer hours
are more likely to prefer a reduction in their weekly working hours, while those
working only few hours per week are more likely to desire an increase. This implies
that there is a point at which the probability of desiring a change in the weekly
working hours is, on average, zero. Booth and Van Ours (2013) identiﬁed this point
and named it the “equilibrium hours of work”.
In the ﬁrst part of the analysis of Chapter 3 we extend the approach of Booth and
Van Ours and show that this equilibrium depends on individual characteristics. For
example, semi- or unskilled manual workers aged 16–35 generally prefer to decrease
their hours worked (on average) when they work about 32 hours or more. For non-
manual workers aged 55–59 the tendency to desire a reduction in weekly working
hours sets in earlier, at about 16 hours per week. The fact that this point diﬀers
between groups with diﬀerent background characteristics motivated the second part
of the analysis.
In the second part of the analysis we investigate several groups of women with
a particular combination of background characteristics and what fraction of each
group works longer hours than the equilibrium hours of work belonging to that
group. This fraction is an indication of how many women with a particular set of
1That is, either no education at all, primary education only, or a vmbo diploma.
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characteristics we expect to be willing to work shorter hours. This analysis provides
useful insights for, for example, a supply-stimulating policy. If applied, a supply-
stimulating policy should primarily be focused on those who desire to reduce their
weekly working hours for at least two reasons. First, the fact that employers like
these women to work longer hours than they prefer to work suggests excess demand
for workers with such characteristics. This is not the case for women who already
prefer to work longer hours.2 Second, aligning preferred and actual working hours
seems to be welfare-enhancing.
The results indicate, for example, that women who are working in business services
relatively often (compared to those working in health care and welfare) work longer
hours than the equilibrium belonging to women with their characteristics. Also,
for highly educated women we ﬁnd that they often work more hours than this
‘equilibrium’ and, therefore, we expect that the tendency to desire a reduction
in the weekly working hours is stronger among this group. The heterogeneity
uncovered here does not only provide policymakers with information on whom (or
which groups) to target with supply-stimulating policy, but also gives them an hour
range in which supply-stimulating policy may be fruitful.
In general, the results presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 imply that the goal of a
supply-stimulating policy should not be to increase the working hours of all working
women in part-time jobs.3 Rather, the analyses show that there are groups of
workers who already prefer to increase the number of hours they work. Stimulating
the supply of labor, in terms of the preferred working hours, of these groups would
be ineﬀective. To be successful, supply-stimulating and other policies should take
into account the heterogeneity analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3.
6.3 Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 we turn to the question of whether working time preferences, as
measured by self-reported preferred working hours, are subject to reference eﬀects.
Several theories, like preference interdependence and habit formation, point to the
importance of reference eﬀects in labor supply. We investigate whether preferences
for work and leisure are aﬀected by such reference eﬀects. We exploit changes
in the length of the standard workweek of (former) West German civil servants
and public sector employees and investigate whether working time preferences
change in response to reductions and extensions in the length of the standard
workweek. In particular, we estimate a standard labor supply model in which we
model an individual’s preferred working hours of work as a function of conventional
determinants of labor supply and augment this model with the length of the
2Rather, in order to increase hours worked in the latter group, one may consider policies
stimulating the demand side of the market (Chapter 2).
3This was the goal of the Task Force Part-time Plus (Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, 2008).
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standard workweek as an additional explanatory variable.
The results indicate that the variations in the standard workweek signiﬁcantly
and strongly changed the preferences with respect to weekly working hours. A
reduction in the standard workweek was followed by a strong contemporaneous
decrease in preferred hours. However, in the subsequent years preferences partly
reverted towards the old level, such that the long-term eﬀect was smaller than
the short-term eﬀect. A workweek extension led to a gradual increase in preferred
weekly working hours over time. That is, we found an asymmetry in the adjustment
process of preferred labor supply for extensions and reductions of standard hours.
Given that the data we have at our disposal are not experimental in nature, we
were unable to pin down the exact mechanism or combination of mechanisms that
account for the eﬀects we detect in our analysis. Rather, we present evidence that a
change in the standard working time aﬀects preferred working hours, which in turn
suggests that reference eﬀects like the ones discussed above do inﬂuence working
time preferences.
For future research it would be valuable to think about whether it is possible
to identify these diﬀerent reference eﬀects (e.g. habit formation and preference
interdependence) separately. And, if so, what kind of data would we need in
order to identify these eﬀects? That is, can we, for example, think of a source
of exogenous variation in the actual hours worked that allows us to estimate the
eﬀect of individual behavior on individual preferences (habit formation), while
guaranteeing that preference-interdependence eﬀects are not in play? In Chapter 4
we cannot make this assumption as one of the potential channels through which the
length of the standard workweek aﬀects individual preferences is the labor supply
behavior of others. Yet, in Chapter 5 we attempt to exclude habit formation as a
potential explanation.
6.4 Chapter 5
As discussed, the analysis in Chapter 4 leaves open through which channel, or
channels, working time preferences are shaped, following a change in the standard
workweek. One of the potential channels through which this eﬀect could work
is preference interdependence with respect to hours worked. That is, individuals
may prefer to work longer hours following an increase in the standard working
time because they observe their co-workers working longer hours. In Chapter 5 we
attempt to empirically isolate the eﬀect of co-workers’ labor supply decisions on the
labor supply preferences of individuals, while ruling out the eﬀect of own behavior
(habit formation) as an explanation.
We model working time preferences as a function of conventional determinants of
labor supply and, in addition, the average of actual hours worked by colleagues.
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To be able to identify the eﬀect of the average hours worked by colleagues on
individual preferences, we would ideally need a change in policy that aﬀected the
average hours worked by someone’s colleagues, but that left this individual’s own
hours worked unchanged. In order to identify the eﬀect of the hours worked by
colleagues on individual preferences we therefore rely on the particular composition
of the workforce in the German public sector, which consists of both public sector
employees and civil servants. These two types of workers are often colleagues and
may even perform the same tasks. Between 1993 and 2005 the standard workweek
of civil servants experienced several prolongations which induced changes in average
hours worked. Using the length of the standard workweek of civil servants as an
instrument for the average hours worked by civil servants we assess empirically
whether the resulting changes aﬀect the stated preferences with respect to working
time of their colleagues in the public sector who work as employees and whose
standard hours did not change. The advantage of this approach is that the sudden
change in the length of the standard working time of civil servants did not seem to
be related to an economic shock that might have aﬀected preferred working hours
of public sector employees simultaneously.
Maintaining the assumption that the standard workweek of civil servants does
not have a direct eﬀect on the preferred working time of public sector employees
(the exclusion restriction), the instrumental-variable estimation indicates that the
average hours worked by civil servants signiﬁcantly and positively aﬀect the working
time preferences of public sector employees. A one-hour increase in average hours
of civil servants increases the preferred working hours of public sector employees by
about two-thirds of an hour.
In order to investigate whether the exclusion restriction holds, we estimate an OLS
regression in which we include the excluded instrument as an additional explanatory
variable in the model. The coeﬃcient of the length of the standard workweek of
civil servants is marginally signiﬁcant, casting doubt on the exclusion restriction on
the instrumental variable. However, because of potential measurement error in the
average hours worked by civil servants it is impossible to provide strong evidence
against (or in favor of) the validity of the exclusion restriction of the instrumental
variable. For the case that the exclusion restriction does not hold, we also presented
the results of a reduced-form estimation in which the preferred hours of public sector
employees are regressed on the standard workweek of civil servants. These results
suggest that a one-hour increase in the standard workweek of civil servants leads to
a ﬁfteen-minute increase in the preferred working time of public sector employees.
This total eﬀect consists of a direct eﬀect of the standard workweek on individual
preferences, as well as the indirect eﬀect of a change in the standard working hours
through the average hours of civil servants.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Het proefschrift
Dit proefschrift is geschreven rondom de vraag hoeveel uur per week werkende
mensen willen werken. Hierbij schenken we aandacht aan twee aspecten.1 Het
eerste aspect heeft betrekking op het verschil tussen het aantal uren dat personen
werken en het aantal uren dat ze aangeven te willen werken. Het tweede aspect
heeft te maken met de vraag hoe voorkeuren voor arbeidsduur worden gevormd.
In de eerste twee inhoudelijke hoofdstukken (Hoofdstukken 2 en 3) staat het verschil
tussen het aantal gewerkte en het aantal gewenste arbeidsuren centraal. Deze
hoofdstukken zijn beschrijvend van aard, en geven inzicht in hoe personen met
verschillende kenmerken van elkaar verschillen met betrekking tot de wens om meer
of minder uren per week te willen werken.
In de laatste twee inhoudelijke hoofdstukken (Hoofdstukken 4 en 5) worden
fundamentelere vragen beantwoord omtrent de vorming van de voorkeuren met
betrekking tot de wekelijkse arbeidsduur. In dit afsluitende hoofdstuk worden
de resultaten van de in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde analyses samengevat en
besproken.
Hoofdstuk 2
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt bekeken hoe werkende vrouwen in Nederland aankijken tegen
hun wekelijkse arbeidsduur. De aanleiding voor dit onderzoek was de wens van het
1Hoewel uitsluitend mijn naam op de voorkant van dit boekje staat, schrijf ik hier en in de rest
van het proefschrift bewust ‘we’. ‘We’, omdat een groot deel van dit proefschrift gebasseerd is op
samenwerking met Thomas Dohmen en Maarten Vendrik.
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toenmalige kabinet (Balkenende IV) dat vrouwen meer uren zouden gaan werken
(Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2008). In dit hoofdstuk wordt
daarom speciﬁek onderzocht in hoeverre werkende vrouwen in Nederland meer of
minder uren willen werken, en hoe de verschillen tussen de feitelijke en gewenste
uren afhangen van persoonskenmerken, zoals het opleidingsniveau, leeftijd, en de
positie in het huishouden. Doel daarvan is om te onderzoeken of het verstandig is
alle werkende vrouwen te stimuleren om meer uren per week te gaan werken.
Met behulp van informatie afkomstig uit een internetpanel wordt de wens om meer
of juist minder uren te werken in beeld gebracht. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat
reeds een groot deel van de werkende vrouwen in Nederland juist minder uren wil
werken, maar dat er ook een groep bestaat (kleiner in omvang) die juist meer uren
wil werken.2 Interessant om te zien is dat deze twee groepen met betrekking tot
achtergrondkenmerken duidelijk van elkaar verschillen. De eerste groep bestaat
voor meer dan de helft uit hoger opgeleiden (hbo en wo) die op het moment van
het invullen van de vragenlijst ook meer uren per week werkten, gemiddeld 34 uur.3
De tweede groep bestaat voor minder dan een kwart uit hoger opgeleiden en heeft
vaker ten hoogste een vmbo opleiding afgerond, werkt doorgaans minder uren (21
uur per week), en heeft in eenvijfde van de gevallen ongeschoold of laaggeschoold
werk.
Uit deze resultaten volgt dat het laten toenemen van de arbeidsduur onder werkende
vrouwen voor een groot deel van de vrouwen geen punt van discussie lijkt, omdat
zij zelfs minder willen werken dan ze al doen. Voor een ander deel van de groep
is het ook niet zozeer een punt van discussie, maar is het probleem eerder dat
men wel meer wil werken, maar dit mogelijk niet gerealiseerd krijgt. In Hoofdstuk
2 wordt daarom beargumenteerd dat bij het maken van beleid deze verschillen in
achtergrondkenmerken en gewenste arbeidsduur op een juiste manier in beschouwing
genomen moeten worden. Voor de ene groep is het belangrijk te achterhalen waar
de problemen zitten met betrekking tot de wens om de arbeidsduur uit te breiden,
terwijl er bij de andere groep in eerste instantie moet worden achterhaald welke
mogelijkheden er zijn om het aantal gewerkte uren niet te doen afnemen.
Hoofdstuk 3
In Hoofdstuk 2 ligt de nadruk op hoe personen met verschillende
achtergrondkenmerken hun arbeidsduur zouden willen aanpassen. In Hoofdstuk
3 ligt de nadruk op de wens om meer of minder uren te werken binnen groepen
personen met vergelijkbare kenmerken. Het uitgangspunt van de analyse in
Hoofdstuk 3 is eerder onderzoek van Booth and Van Ours (2013) waaruit blijkt
2Men heeft antwoord gegeven op de vraag: “Hoeveel uren per week zou u in totaal willen
werken? Het gaat om het aantal uren in alle banen die u hebt, bij elkaar genomen.”
3De onderliggende cijfers zijn te vinden in Tabel 2.1.
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dat personen die relatief weinig uren werken hun arbeidsduur doorgaans willen
verhogen, terwijl mensen die relatief veel uren werken, hun arbeidsduur vaker
willen laten afnemen. Ergens tussen deze twee uitersten in bestaat er een aantal
uren per week waarbij men gemiddeld genomen niet meer of minder uren wil
werken. Het werk van Booth en Van Ours toont aan dat dit ‘evenwicht’ voor
gehuwde en samenwonende vrouwen in Nederland rond de 21 uur per week ligt.4
In Hoofdstuk 3 laten we in het eerste deel van de analyse zien dat het punt
waarbij men de arbeidsduur gemiddeld genomen niet wil aanpassen afhangt
van achtergrondkenmerken. Zo ligt het hierboven beschreven ‘evenwicht’ voor
ongeschoolde of laaggeschoolde vrouwelijke werknemers in de leeftijd van 16 tot 35
jaar bij ongeveer vier voltijddagen (32 uur per week). Bij 55-plussers die geschoolde
arbeid verrichten ligt dit ‘evenwicht’ bij ongeveer 16 uur per week. Dit betekent
dat bij een arbeidsduur tot aan 32 uur per week personen in de eerstgenoemde
groep gemiddeld genomen meer uren willen werken. Voorbij de 32 uur verandert
dit (gemiddeld genomen) in een wens om de arbeidsduur te laten afnemen. Bij de
laatstgenoemde groep doet dit zich al voor vanaf 16 uur per week. Het ‘evenwicht’
met betrekking tot gewerkte uren hangt dus af van achtergrondkenmerken.
In het tweede deel van de analyse wordt bekeken hoe de verdeling van de
arbeidsduur eruit ziet binnen groepen met verschillende achtergrondkenmerken.
Wanneer een groot aandeel van de personen binnen een bepaalde groep minder
uren werkt dan het ‘evenwicht’ behorende bij die groep, betekent dit dat (wederom,
gemiddeld genomen) personen binnen die groep vaak de wens zullen hebben om hun
arbeidsduur uit te breiden. Het stimuleren van het arbeidsaanbod bij een dergelijke
groep zal weinig eﬀect hebben op het aantal gewerkte uren van een dergelijke groep,
aangezien een groot deel van de personen binnen een dergelijke groep de arbeidsduur
reeds wil uitbreiden.
De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 laten dus zien dat de wens om de
arbeidsduur te veranderen niet alleen verschilt tussen groepen met verschillende
achtergrondkenmerken (Hoofdstuk 2), maar dat het verschil in de abeidsduur binnen
die groepen ook in ogenschouw moet worden genomen.
Hoofdstuk 4
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt onderzocht of voorkeuren met betrekking tot de wekelijkse
arbeidsduur worden be¨ınvloed door zogenaamde referentie-eﬀecten. Verschilende
theoriee¨n voorspellen namelijk dat de eigen arbeidsduur (gewoontevorming)
en/of de arbeidsduur van andere personen in een referentiegroep (interpersonele
4Het gaat hierbij niet om een evenwicht zoals dat doorgaans in de economische theorie
besproken wordt, namelijk een situatie waarin geen van de personen zijn of haar manier van
handelen zou willen aanpassen, gegeven het handelen van de andere personen in de economie.
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afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren) van invloed kunnen zijn op de vorming van de
voorkeuren van een individu.5
Om een dergelijke onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden is doorgaans een experiment
nodig. Dat wil zeggen: Idealiter zouden we mensen in een laboraturiumsetting
plaatsen, en vervolgens hun arbeidsduur veranderen. Vervolgens zou onderzocht
kunnen worden of en hoe de verandering van de arbeidsduur de voorkeuren
verandert. Het is echter heel lastig (en onethisch, bovendien) om mensen te dwingen
een exact aantal uren per week te werken. In Hoofdstuk 4 maken we daarom
gebruik van een zogenoemd natuurlijk experiment. In dat experiment verandert
de lengte van de standaardwerkweek van ambtenaren (Beamte) en werknemers
(Angestellte) van de Duitse overheid. In het hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht in hoeverre
deze verandering in wetgeving de voorkeuren met betrekking tot gewenste uren heeft
be¨ınvloed.
De resultaten laten zien dat de standaardwerkweek, bovenop de leeftijd, het uurloon
en de huishuidsamenstelling, een signiﬁcante invloed heeft op de gewenste wekelijkse
arbeidsduur. Helaas is het aan de hand van de data die we tot onze beschikking
hebben niet mogelijk om exact te achterhalen welke van de verschillende door
de theorie voorspelde mechanismen het eﬀect van de standaardwerkweek op de
gewenste arbeidsduur verklaren. Zo voorspelt de theorie van de gewoontevorming
dat een verandering van de eigen arbeidsduur leidt tot een verandering van
de voorkeuren met betrekking tot diezelfde arbeidsduur. De theorie van de
interpersonele afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren (IAV) voorspelt dat een verandering
van de arbeidsduur van een referentiegroep, bijvoorbeeld collega’s, een direct eﬀect
heeft op individuele voorkeuren. Omdat men doorgaans als groep collega’s getroﬀen
wordt door een verandering in de standaardwerkweek, en nooit als individu, is het
lastig om binnen een groep collega’s (zoals Beamte of Angestellte) het potentie¨le
eﬀect van gewoontevorming te onderscheiden van het eﬀect van IAV.
Hoofdstuk 5
Zoals besproken in de vorige paragraaf is het lastig om te achterhalen hoe
het mechanisme, of de combinatie van mechanismen, achter het eﬀect van de
standaardwerkweek op de voorkeuren voor de arbeidsduur exact werkt. Ee´n van
de mogelijke mechanismen is interpersonele afhankelijkheid van voorkeuren (IAV).
Dit betekent dat de arbeidsduur van personen in iemands referentiegroep een direct
eﬀect heeft op de voorkeuren met betrekking tot de arbeidsduur van die persoon.
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt onderzocht of de voorkeuren met betrekking tot de
arbeidsduur van personen die zelf geen verandering in de standaardwerkweek
5In het inhoudelijke hoofdstuk en het conclusiehoofdstuk worden verschillende andere mogelijke
manieren besproken waarop een dergelijke verandering van de (standaard) arbeidsduur van invloed
kan zijn op voorkeuren.
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ondergaan worden be¨ınvloed door de arbeidsduur van collega’s, die wel een
dergelijke verandering ondergaan. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van het feit
dat Beamte (ambtenaren) en Angestellte (andere werknemers in het publieke
domein) onder andere regelgeving vallen met betrekking tot de lengte van de
standaardwerkweek, maar wel vaak collega’s zijn. Zo kon er in de periode tussen
2003 en 2009 dus een situatie ontstaan waarin Beamte wel een verandering van de
standaardwerkweek ondergingen, terwijl een dergelijke verandering voor Angestellte
niet gold.
Door dit verschil in regelgeving hebben we kunnen onderzoeken in hoeverre de
voorkeuren van Angestellte hebben gereageerd op een verandering van de gewerkte
uren van Beamte, zonder dat zij zelf veranderingen in hun arbeidsduur ondergingen.
Dit is een interessant vraagstuk, omdat hier e´e´n van de andere mogelijke
verklaringen van de relatie tussen de standaardwerkweek en de voorkeuren met
betrekking tot gewenste uren, namelijk gewoontevorming, kan worden uitgesloten
als verklaring.
De resultaten laten zien dat een verandering van de standaardwerkweek van Beamte
heeft geleid tot een toename van hun arbeidsduur en dat deze toename in de
arbeidsduur van de groep Beamte heeft geleid tot een kleine verhoging in de
gewenste arbeidsduur van Angestellte.
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